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Regulation of Drug Treatments for
HIV and AIDS: a Contractarian
Model of Access
Steven R. Salbut
The HIV/AIDS epidemic has provoked a reexamination of U.S. drug
testing and approval policies. The traditionally conservativeposture of the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) has resulted in the development of a highly
protective and lengthy drug approval process that denies consumers early
access to experimental drugs. While this paternalistic approval process may be
warranted in most cases, it can deprive HIV/AIDS patients and others suffering
from similarly -life-threatening diseases of their only hope for effective
treatment. Professor Salbu examines the shortcomings of both the paternalistic
model employed by the FDA and the open access model proposed by AIDS
activists in light of the conflicting interests of the individual, the pharmaceutical
industry, and the state. Professor Salbu offers a contractarian model that would
limit government intrusion and allow individuals to assume the risk of taking
untested but potentially promising drugs. This article recommends a specific
policy that recognizes the primacy of individual autonomy while protecting the
more limited interests of both industry and the state.
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Introduction
The world has lived with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
("AIDS") for over fifteen years.' By late 1993, the number of deaths
attributable to AIDS in the United States alone surpassed 200,000.2 AIDS is
presently the leading cause of death among both men and women between the
ages of 25 to 44 in many cities.3 Although homosexual men comprised forty-
eight percent of AIDS diagnoses in 1993, the incidence of AIDS is increasing
most rapidly among other groups, including women,4 racial and ethnic
minorities,5 and intravenous drug users.6 Projections by the Centers for Disease
1. The first sign of AIDS to receive worldwide attention was a concentration of Kaposi's sarcoma
cases observed among male homosexuals in the United States in 1979. It is possible that AIDS-related
illnesses pre-date these earliest observations but were simply not recognized as having a shared viral
source.
2. Anne Rochell, AIDS Deaths in U.S. Top 200,000; Next 14 Months to Claim at Least 130,000
More, ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Oct. 29, 1993, at Al.
3. Richard M. Selik et al., HIV Infection as Leading Cause of Death Among Young Adults in US.
Cities and States, 270 JAMA 2991 (1993).
4. For a detailed argument that the construction of AIDS as a gay male disease has impaired research
and treatment of AIDS among women, see GENA COREA, THE INVISIBLE EPIDEMIC: THE STORY OF WOMEN
AND AIDS (1992).
5. Some suggest that the danger of AIDS among racial and ethnic minorities must be addressed more
aggressively. See, e.g., Catherine Woodard, Minorities Often Hit By AIDS Infections; Struck More by
Fatal Pneumonia, NEWSDAY, Oct. 10, 1993, at 59 (referring to efforts by the Gay Men's Health Crisis
to provide services and outreach programs for minorities, in the absence of adequate government
attention). Others have contended that reports of high incidence among blacks and Hispanics are racist.
See, e.g., Tony Brown, Tony Brown's Journal: Report Blames Blacks and Hispanics for AIDS, ETHNIC
NEWSWATCH, Jan. 21, 1993, at 5b. For a psychological and sociological analysis of AIDS among blacks,




Control ("CDC") suggest that AIDS-related deaths will continue to mount
rapidly in the foreseeable future.7 While a number of treatments for AIDS are
available,8 there is presently neither a vaccination nor a cure.
Today, two of the most compelling goals of current AIDS policy-the
need to engage in effective scientific and medical research and the challenge
of meeting the current medical needs of those who are HIV-positive and those
who have AIDS (hereinafter "HIV+/PWA" 9 )-are in potential conflict °. At first
glance, these crucial goals appear largely compatible. We place our faith in
scientific and medical research to deliver us from the epidemic through the
development of an effective vaccination, cure, or treatment." In this sense,
decisions that support the quality and quantity of AIDS research today and
tomorrow will redound to the benefit of untold numbers of persons in the more
distant future. Yet while the interests of current research and the needs of future
patients are congruous, a tension exists between the goals of current research
and the needs of existing patients who face imminent suffering and death. 2
6. AIDS is Top Killer Among Young Men, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1993, at AI9.
7. The CDC estimates that 500,000 Americans will be diagnosed with AIDS by 1995. AIDS Deaths
Mount More Slowly, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1993, at A2.
8. While only a few AIDS treatment drugs, such as AZT and ddl, target HIV infection itself, a
number of treatments have been developed for the many opportunistic infections and other medical
complications that are common to individuals with HIV-related illness and AIDS. These include foscavir
(for the prevention of CMV retinitis) and aerosolized pentamidine (for the treatment of pneumocystic
carinii pneumonia).
9. It will often be necessary to refer simultaneously in these pages to both persons who are HIV-
positive and persons with AIDS. When an observation herein refers to both groups, the term
"HIV+/PWAs" has been adopted as a shorthand form intended to achieve clarity and avoid rhetorical
clumsiness.
10. Persons with extremely debilitating, terminal illnesses such as AIDS may have little patience
with the norms of scientific rigor, and are often willing to assume responsibility for, and risks associated
with, the use of promising but untested experimental drugs.
For example, Paul Monette's autobiographical account discusses AIDS using a martial metaphor,
describing in detail the battle he, his lover, and his friends fought against the progress of the disease. PAUL
MONETTE, BORROWED TIME: AN AIDS MEMOIR (1988). He describes an AIDS underground information
network of patients whose observations, though anecdotal, may provide the earliest clues regarding
potential treatments and effects. The conditions Monette describes are the conditions of war, complete
with the threat of imminent suffering and death. It is not surprising that many PWAs see governmental
regulation of drugs as a safeguard too luxurious to serve their health care needs.
11. Research in these areas may become more highly integrated, because the prospect of "therapeutic
vaccines" is considered increasingly promising by the scientific community. Therapeutic or treatment
vaccines are those that "not only protect healthy people against infection but might also serve as a form
of therapy for those already infected." Jon Cohen, Lobbying for an AIDS Trial, 258 SCIENCE 536, 536,
(1992).
12. Dr. Alastair Clayton, director general of the Federal Center for AIDS in Ottawa, Canada, has
argued that "[t]here are not that many individuals who have AIDS and not that many with symptomatic
infection, so we have to encourage them to go on trials rather than getting the drugs through emergency
drug release because then we don't learn as much." In contrast, Timothy McCaskell, chair of AIDS Action
Now in Toronto, focuses on the availability of drugs regardless of source: "Whether people have access
to a particular treatment through a trial or through emergency drug release or through some other
mechanism, we really don't care." Nora Underwood, A New War on AIDS: Activists are Gaining More
Access to Drugs, MACLEANS, Sept. 18, 1989, at 62.
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The conflict between scientific research programs and the interests of those
seeking immediate treatment is a function of the role of the HIV+/PWA as both
research subject and patient." While patients expect and deserve to be treated
as ends in themselves, experimental subjects inherently serve as means to
extrinsic ends. The goal of research is primarily the achievement of knowledge
rather than the improvement of any one patient's health. In the role of patient,
the HIV+/PWA looks for treatment in accordance with personal privacy,
autonomy, dignity, and respect." In the role of experimental subject, the
HIV+/PWA is handled as a data source from which knowledge is to be derived.
The roles of patient and subject are compatible only insofar as two conditions
are met. First, knowledge received during investigation must be channeled into
more effective treatment of the patient-subjects. Second, the patient's ability
to control the direction of treatment must not be forfeited as a condition of
participation.
The tension between the roles of the HIV+/PWA as patient and as subject
is exacerbated by the traditionally conservative posture of the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") in the drug approval process. Treatments approved for
marketing in other countries are frequently unavailable in the United States. 5
Historically, this disparity in drug availability has been a function of FDA
regulatory processes that are lengthy and bureaucratically rigid relative to those
of other nations. Prior to reform in the 1980s, the time frame from initiation
13. While this Article concerns AIDS drugs, many of its conclusions and recommendations are
applicable to treatments for other life-threatening diseases. The tension between individual as patient and
individual as research subject existed before AIDS, but gained greater public attention through HIV and
AIDS advocacy. AIDS is-indistinguishable for the overall purposes of this discussion from other diseases
that are terminal, for which there is no known cure or effective treatment that is unaccompanied by serious
risk or potential side effects. While this Article addresses AIDS as a particular example in analyzing the
intricacies of FDA regulation, the conclusions are generally applicable to the regulation of treatments for
any diseases meeting the definitive criteria.
The most salient example ofa pre-AIDS drug access issue concerned laetrile, a controversial cancer
treatment that was unapproved in the United States but available in Mexico during the 1970s. In United
States v. Rutherford, the plaintiffs sought access to lactrile despite the absence of FDA approval. The 10th
Circuit Court of Appeals was sympathetic to the arguments of terminally ill patients, observing that the
FDA's concepts of safety and effectiveness "have no reasonable application to terminally ill cancer
patients." 582 F. 2d 1237, 1236 (10th Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court reversed, recognizing an expansive
FDA mandate to ensure safety and effectiveness of all drugs, including those sought by terminally ill
patients. 442 U.S. 544, 552 (1979).
14. For more elaborate discussion of privacy, autonomy, dignity, and respect in the treatment of
HIV+/PWA, see infra part III.A.
15. The culture of FDA approval procedures has been characterized as "deadly over-caution." Carolyn
Lochhead, "Deadly Over-Caution": FDA Assailed for Slow Testing of New Drugs, SAN FRAN. CHRON.,
Oct. 26, 1992, at AI (quoting unidentified critics of the FDA).
Low tolerance levels for FDA approval time frames are exacerbated by suggestions that the process
is needlessly dilatory. One study indicates that average FDA approval periods are substantially longer
than comparable periods in the United Kingdom. Kaitin et al., The Drug Lag: An Update of New Drug
Introductions in the United States and the United Kingdom, 1977 through 1987, 46 CLIN. PHARMACOLOGY




of investigation to FDA approval of drugs averaged approximately twelve
years. 6 While a number of legal and regulatory modifications discussed in this
Article have reduced average approval periods considerably, 7 a number of
regulatory hurdles remain. These impediments to the expedient availability of
HIV/AIDS treatments should be carefully scrutinized. Those that are unjustified
should be expunged.
This Article proposes workable contract-based 8 reforms of the FDA drug
approval process that are designed to improve HIV+/PWA access to
experimental AIDS drugs, either within or outside the context of experimental
participation. The analysis incorporates the legal, ethical, and policy
considerations that justify a movement from quasi-contractarian regulatory
amendments, promulgated beginning in 1987, to a more purely contractarian
stance.
Under this regulatory scheme, pharmaceutical companies engaged in
developing drugs for AIDS treatment would be permitted, but not required, to
sell experimental drugs to HIV+/PWAs who choose not to participate, or are
unable to participate, in clinical trials. While the terms elected by mutually
consenting supplier and buyer will vary from case to case, contractual
arrangements could potentially include two important provisions. HIV+/PWAs
seeking extra-experimental access could be required by manufacturers to pay
a reasonable price for the drugs they receive; they could also be required to sign
waivers of informed consent, exonerating the pharmaceutical supplier and
prescribing physician from any and all liability associated with using the drug. 9
These proposed regulations are framed to balance concern for individual
autofiomy and choice, governmental and public interest in eradicating AIDS,
and corporate incentives for developing new AIDS treatments. The Article
argues that a contractarian model best achieves a balance of these concerns.
Part I discusses the history of pharmaceutical regulation in the United
States and the processes used by the FDA to approve drugs. This part also
outlines the most recent Congressional and FDA proposals for future regulatory
reform. Part II examines three regulatory models of drug access: paternalism,
open access, and contractarianism. Part III argues in favor of a contractarian
approach, balancing the interests of patients, private corporations, and the state.
This part includes an examination of privacy and autonomy interests of patients
16. See David Rotman, The Price ofDoingR&DSoars, CHEMICAL WEEK, June 13,1990, at 46 (citing
findings from Tufts University Center for the Study of Drug Development).
17. The findings of one study suggest that this average has been reduced from twelve years to just
over six years. Id
18. Contractarianism augments the use of contract to supplant regulatory functions. For a detailed
discussion, analysis, and critical examination of contractarianism, see Jean Braucher, Contract Versus
Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697 (1990).
19. Under a contractarian model, exchange relations will be modulated by self-interest and self-
protection, such that companies will ordinarily be unwilling to sell highly speculative products without
adequate compensation and mitigation of risk.
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and corporations, as well as the public interest in scientific and medical research
progress. Part IV outlines proposed regulatory modifications to the existing
FDA approval system. The Conclusion suggests that we adopt 'a regulatory
policy that supports individual rights, relatively free from governmental
coercion or intrusiveness. Under the proposed contractarian scheme, benefits
would exceed costs, and costs would be borne by those individuals who chose
to assume the risk of taking untested but perhaps highly promising drugs. The
availability of an enforceable contractual liability waiver would ensure that
those who claim the interests of freedom are also willing to assume a
corresponding responsibility for their choices and actions.
I. History of the FDA Approval Process
This part examines the process and underlying rationale for both the
ordinary FDA approval track and the accelerated track for certain
investigational new drugs ("INDs"). It also examines the development of
regulations that allow pre-approval prescription of experimental drugs
("treatment INDs") under a limited set of conditions. Finally, this part provides
an overview of recent legislative and administrative proposals, some already
adopted, including parallel track trials, the use of surrogate markers in the drug
approval process, external review of IND applications, and proposals for
enhanced reciprocity with foreign pharmaceutical regulatory agencies.
A. Regulation of Drugs in the United States Prior to AIDS
In the United States, new drugs cannot ordinarily be marketed without
FDA approval.2" The current approval process has developed out of a series of
governmental reactions to intermittent crises and disasters over the past century.
Without exception, Congress has increased regulatory authority over the
approval of new drugs as a result of media coverage of either pervasive abuses
or specific tragedies.
The Pure Food and Drug Act ("1906 Act"),2' enacted in 1906 in response
to criticism by the Progressive movement of widespread food and drug
impurities," established liability for the manufacture of adulterated23 or
misbranded24 drugs. The 1906 Act was weak by today's standards. It required
20. See infra text accompanying notes 34-42.
21. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (repealed 1938).
22. For a discussion of the history of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, see Peter Barton Hutt,
Development of Federal Law Regulating Slack Fill and Deceptive Packaging of Food, Drugs, and
Cosmetics, 42 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1987).
23. Pure Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915, §7, 34 Stat. at 769.




a manufacturer to monitor its drugs for strength, quality, and purity,25 and to
provide complete and accurate labelling of drug contents.26 However, in 1911,
the Supreme Court ruled that while the language of the Act prohibited
mislabeling of drug ingredients, it did not prohibit other kinds of fraudulent
claims made on product labels." Moreover, the 1906 Act failed to enumerate
standards or specific methods of pre-market testing that would prevent
adulteration, or to provide any mechanism for centralized regulatory approval
of new drugs." Finally, while the Act provided for criminal prosecution of
manufacturers,29 it did not establish liability for infliction of injury or death as
a consequence of marketing adulterated or misbranded drugs.
In 1937, the shortcomings of the 1906 Act were demonstrated by the
tragedy brought on by the use of Elixir Sulfanilamide, marketed by the drug
manufacturer Massengill. While the "elixir" was merely a liquid version of a
drug already available in pill form, the solvent used in the solution had not
been tested for safety. Its toxicity resulted in 107 deaths.3 Under the 1906 Act,
Massengill was fined $26,100 for product mislabeling.3
Following the Elixir Sulfanamilide tragedy, lawmakers responded to public
concern by strengthening regulatory control over pharmaceutical products.32
They argued that the 1906 Act needed to be strengthened to avert future
tragedies, and that the government should not simply rely upon the deterrent
effects of fines. This goal could be achieved by preventing dangerous new
drugs from entering the market.3" Towards that end, Congress passed the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act ("1938 Act"),34 which required safety
testing and government approval of new drugs35 prior to commercial
25. Id. §§ 1-12, 34 Stat. at 768-72.
26. Id
27. United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911). In 1912, to remedy this shortcoming, Congress
passed the Sherley Amendment, which prohibited false or fraudulent claims made on drug labels. Act
of Aug. 13, 1912, ch. 352, § 8, 37 Stat. 416.
28. The 1906 Act did authorize the Bureau of Chemistry of the Department of Agriculture to conduct
compliance examinations of drugs. Pure Food and Drug Act, ch. 3915, § 4, 34 Stat. at 416. However,
this provision did not require pre-marketing approval and served merely as an enforcement tool for
spotting offenses in the marketplace.
29. Id. §§ 1-5, 9-10, 34 Stat. at 768-9, 771-2.
30. Arthur Hull Hayes, Food and Drug Regulation After 75 Years, 246 JAMA 1223, 1224 (1981).
For further discussion of the relationship between the Elixir Sulfanilamide tragedy and the 1938 Act, see
David F. Cavers, Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive
Provisions, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2, 20 (1939).
31. The manufacturers failed to list diethylene glycol, the toxic component of Elixir Sulfanilamide,
on the label. Cavers, stpra note 30, at 20; PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES at 42 (1980).
32. See TEMIN, supra note 31, at 43.
33. Lisa Terrizzi, The Need for Improved Access to Experimental Drug Therapy: AIDS Activists and
Their Call for a Parallel Track Policy, 4 ADMIN. L.J. 589, 590 (1991).
34. Pub. L. No. 52-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1988)).
35. Under the 1906 Act, drugs covered by adulteration and mislabeling provisions were restricted
to those listed in two pharmaceutical registries: United States Pharmacopoeia and National Formulary.
Ch. 3915, §§ 6-7, 34 Stat. at 769-70. Because this limitation proved unreasonably restrictive, particularly
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marketing.36 Under the provisions of the 1938 Act, prospective manufacturers
were required to file applications for the sale of new drugs with the Secretary
of Agriculture, describing drug components and composition, methods of
production control, and proposed labeling language. 37 The 1938 Act also
required that applicants supply copies of investigational safety reports, as well
as samples of the drugs under consideration.3" Unless the Secretary of
Agriculture rejected or postponed consideration of the application within sixty
days of filing, default approval was conferred by statute. 39 The 1938 Act also
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations exempting
INDs from this approval process.4"
As the Elixir Sulfanilamide disaster inspired the 1938 Act, so the
thalidomide tragedy4 resulted in the Kefauver-Harris Amendments ("1962
Amendments").42 The 1962 Amendments required more rigorous pre-approval
drug testing than was required under the 1938 Act, instituting a series of
clinical testing "phases" that comprise the norm under current law.43 At present,
the initial step in obtaining FDA approval entails testing on animals to
determine whether the drug is sufficiently safe and promising to justify human
experimentation.44 Using evidence gathered in these preliminary tests to support
in its failure to cover the new drugs most likely to require supervision, the 1938 Act required safety
testing of new drugs. Ch. 675, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040, 1052-53.
36. The 1938 Act did not, however, require that a new drug be tested for effectiveness, nor that the
effectiveness be reasonably proven as part of the approval process. Hoffman, Defining "New Drugs":
Recent Developments Affecting Prescription Drug Premarket Approval Requirements, 37 FOOD DRUG COSM.
L.J. 355; 356 (1982).
37. Ch. 675, § 505(b), 52 Stat. 1052 (1938) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §355(b) (1987 & Supp. 1989)).
38. Id.
39. Ch. 675, § 505(c), 52 Stat. 1040, 1052 (1938).
40. Ch. 675, § 505(i), 52 Stat. 1040, 1052 (1938).
41. Thalidomide, marketed as a sedative safe for usage by pregnant women, resulted in birth defects
in thousands of infants. For discussion of the testing, marketing, and effects of thalidomide during the
late 1950s and early 1960s, see HARVEY TEFF & COLIN R. MUNRO, THALIDOMIDE: THE LEGAL AFTERMATH 1-10
(1976).
42. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-81
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
For the history of the 1962 Amendments and discussion of the problem of thalidomide in the
context of this process, see VIEWS OF SENATORS ESTES KEFAUVER, JOHN A. CARROLL, THOMAS J. DODD, PHILIP
A. HART, AND EDWARD V. LONG, S. REP No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in 1962
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2884, 2898, 2905-07.
43. For discussion of the clinical testing phases, see infra text accompanying notes 47-50.
44. The value of animal testing of experimental drugs prior to human trials is controversial. Critics
contend that differences among animals and humans in metabolizing substances renders results of animal
testing questionable as applied to humans. Animal testing has been characterized as both underinclusive
and overinclusive, in that promising treatments are eliminated and potentially dangerous treatments are
allowed to proceed through the approval process. See John P. Dillman, Note, Prescription Drug Approval




safety and efficacy claims, the drug sponsor files an IND application, seeking
FDA authorization to begin the process of testing on humans.4"
The current process of submitting INDs for clinical testing approval is
relatively straightforward. An IND application serves as notification to the FDA
that clinical trials are about to be initiated by the company, and permits tpthe
FDA to engage in an initial assessment of the value of those trials on the basis
of information provided by the applicant.46 If the IND application is granted,
the sponsor is permitted to begin clinical experimentation on human subjects,
which is mandatory for final FDA approval of manufacture and distribution.
A three-phase process of testing on human subjects is now the FDA
standard. Phase I comprises initial safety testing, during which a relatively
small sample of healthy, asymptomatic subjects receive the drug and are
monitored for indications that the drug may be unsafe for human applications.4"
If the results of Phase I provide a preliminary indication that the drug is safe,
the sponsor proceeds to Phase II, during which both the safety and efficacy of
the drug are examined through controlled experimentation upon a larger sample
of infected or symptomatic subjects.49 If the results from Phase II are
promising, a larger sample will be used in Phase III to further assess safety and
efficacy."
If the IND sponsor has gleaned promising results through Phase III, it may
decide to continue seeking FDA approval by submitting a new drug application
("NDA"), which provides the FDA with information that includes the data
collected and analyzed during experimentation." Within 180 days, the FDA
must either approve the application or notify the applicant of the opportunity
to request a hearing on the merits of the application. 2 The FDA's approval is
45. The filing of such application covers only the sponsor applicant's research team. Approval to
proceed to clinical testing therefore permits only those listed as investigators to engage in experimentation
with the IND. David A. Kessler, The Regulation oflnvestigational Drugs, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED., Feb.
2, 1989, at 281, 282. This limitation restricts clinical IND access to sponsored drugs.
46. The IND application contains, inter alia, names of parties responsible for the investigation, a
statement of the investigational plan, a statement of the name of the drug to be tested and all its active
ingredients, a summary of any previous human experience with the drug, a description of the overall plan
for investigation, identification of phases of clinical investigation, a list of possible risks and side effects,
a protocol for each planned study, and a summary of pharmacological and toxicological effects of the
drug on animals. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (1988).
47. Id. § 312.21.
48. Id. § 312.21(a).
49. Id. § 312.22(b).
50. Id. § 312.22(c). In addition, a fourth and final phase follows drug approval. Phase IV consists
of post-approval monitoring of drugs after they have been placed on the market. Id. § 312.85. Phase IV
testing can be used by the FDA to measure the safety and efficacy of approved drugs on an ongoing basis,
and to reevaluate drugs in light of developing scientific and medical knowledge. Since the focus here
is on experimental drugs prior to FDA approval, Phase IV is of minimal relevance to the concerns raised
in this Article.
51. The NDA contains data demonstrating "whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether
such drug is effective in use." 21 U.S.C. §355(b)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
52. Id.
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based on acceptable proof of the safety and efficacy of the drug when used for
the purposes stipulated by the drug's sponsor.53
B. Recent Developments in Drug Regulation
The more stringent drug approval processes created by the 1962
amendments, while intended to protect the public, have contributed to a
growing dissatisfaction over issues of consumer access.54 AIDS has increased
the level of discontent with the approval processes because of delays in access
to drugs, and because of the conflict inherent in forcing HIV+/PWAs to become
research subjects in order to receive experimental drug treatment. This section
examines the present regulatory approach to drug access, with particular
emphasis on recent amendments promulgated largely in response to AIDS.
Although these amendments have been somewhat effective, they have not
adequately addressed the tension between the treatment of HIV+/PWAs and the
research value of those patients in the effort to eradicate AIDS.
During the 1980s and 1990s, HIV+/PWA organizations and groups in the
gay community applied substantial pressure on Congress and the FDA to
provide accelerated access to new AIDS drugs." Largely as a result of these
efforts, new rules and procedures were promulgated in 1987, 1988, 1991, and
1992. These rules and procedures have been intended to expedite access to
experimental drugs for terminally ill patients.
A regulation promulgated in 1987 (the "1987 Amendment")56 allows
physicians to prescribe experimental drugs to patients as treatment INDs"
provided that (a) the drugs are "intended to treat a serious5 8 or immediately life-
53. The 1962 Amendments require "substantial evidence ... consisting of adequate and well-
controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and
responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented
to have ... "Id § 355(d). Authorization of clinical testing can be revoked by the FDA if evidence arises
suggesting that human drug testing is unsafe. Id §§ 321(p), 355.
54. For criticism of the 1962 Amendments, see Barry S. Roberts & David Z. Bodenheimer, The Drug
Amendments of 1962: The Anatomy of a Regulatory Failure, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 581 (arguing that "the
increased burdens of regulatory compliance delayed the availability and discouraged the innovation of
new drugs.")
55. Philip J. Hilts, How the AIDS Crisis Made Drug Regulators Speed Up, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
1989, at D5.
56. 21 C.F.R. § 312 (1988).
57. For a practical guide to treatment INDs provided by the FDA, see Frank E. Young et al., The
FDA's New Procedures for the Use of Investigational Drugs in Treatment, 259 JAMA 2267 (1988).
58. In the 1987 and subsequent FDA Amendments, the FDA has consistently used "serious" as a
qualifier in tandem with the somewhat less ambiguous "life-threatening." In 1992, the FDA observed that
seriousness "is a matter of judgment, but generally is based on... such factors as survival, day-to-day
functioning, or the likelihood that the disease, if left untreated, will progress from a less severe condition
to a more serious one." 57 Fed. Reg. 13235 (1992). While this definition of seriousness does provide




threatening disease"; (b) there is "no... satisfactory alternative drug or other
therapy available" for treatment; (c) clinical investigations have either been
completed or are presently in progress; and (d) the drug's sponsor is seeking
drug marketing approval with due diligence. 9 Treatment INDs can ordinarily
be prescribed only during Phase.Ill investigations under the 1987 Amendment.6"
Treatment INDs can also be dispensed during Phase II under "appropriate
circumstances" but "ordinarily not earlier than Phase II. ' ' 6I In addition, the FDA
is authorized to approve ad-hoc applications for emergency INDs on a patient-
by-patient basis.62 By early 1992, over twenty drugs had been distributed as
treatment INDS for the treatment of specific diseases including AIDS, cancer,
Parkinson's disease, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and neonatal respiratory
distress syndrome.63
Under the 1987 Amendment, pharmaceutical manufacturers must apply to
the FDA for authorization to charge patients for treatment INDs.6 4 The FDA
has thirty days to reject the application. If it does not do so within that time
period, the application is automatically authorized.65 Approval to charge patients
for treatment INDs is granted only under the following conditions:
(i) There is adequate enrollment in the ongoing clinical investigations
under the authorized IND; (ii) charging does not constitute
commercial marketing of a new drug for which a marketing
application has not been approved; (iii) the drug is not being
commercially promoted or advertised; and (iv) the sponsor of the drug
is actively pursuing marketing approval with due diligence.66
The FDA treats the sale of INDs used in clinical trials ("clinical INDs")
more strictly than the sale of treatment INDs. A request for approval to charge
subjects for clinical INDs requires the sponsor to explain why "charging is
The FDA has provided some examples of serious diseases, such as: AIDS, "all other stages of
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, Alzheimer's dementia, angina pectoris, heart failure,
[and] cancer." Id. The agency also considers as serious "many chronic illnesses that are generally well-
managed by available therapy" but which "can have serious outcomes." Id. The FDA has offered the
following as examples of diseases in this category: "inflammatory bowel disease, asthma, rheumatoid
arthritis, diabetes mellitus, systemic lupus, erythematosus, depression, [and] psychoses .. " The FDA
acknowledges that these chronic illnesses may be considered serious for some but not all populations,
or during some but not all phases. Id.
59. 21 C.F.R. § 312.34(b)(l)(i)-(iv) (1988).
60. Id. § 312.34(a).
61. Id.
62. 21 C.F.R. § 312.36 (1988). For a discussion of emergency INDs, see Ellen C. Cooper, Changes
in Normal Drug Approval Process in Response to the AIDS Crisis, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 329, 334-35
(1990).
63. 57 Fed. Reg. 13,234 (1992).
64. 52 Fed. Reg. 19,476 (1987).
65. Id.
66. 21 C.F.R. § 312.7(d)(2) (1992).
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necessary in order for the sponsor to undertake or continue the clinical trial."67
This requirement suggests that there are legitimate and illegitimate purposes
for selling clinical INDs. Patients may be charged to generate revenues that are
necessary to defray the cost of ongoing clinical trials of the IND; they may not
be charged for general commercial purposes that are not closely linked to the
viability of those trials.
The 1988 Procedures68 establish relatively "fast-track" drug approval of
treatments aimed at life threatening and severely debilitating diseases.69 Because
they are viewed as provisional and temporary, and aimed largely at the
challenges posed by AIDS, the 1988 Procedures are commonly referred to as
interim provisions. According to the FDA, the procedures were adopted in
recognition of the fact that "patients are generally willing to accept greater risks
or side effects from products that treat life-threatening and severely debilitating
illnesses, than they would accept from products that treat less serious
illnesses."70
Drugs that qualify under these "fast-track" provisions can be approved in
the absence of traditionally required Phase III clinical testing. According to
FDA projections, this modification has the capacity to shave years off the
ordinary lab-to-market time frame.7 The 1988 Procedures provide numerous
opportunities for companies seeking expedited approval to confer with FDA
authorities while designing research protocols and preparing the IND
application.72 Under these procedures, the FDA may meet with sponsors prior
to IND submission, as well as at the end of Phase I testing.7" Following Phase
II testing, the FDA evaluates applications for expedited approval by weighing
the risks and benefits of the drug in light of the severity of the disease at issue
and the availability of alternative therapies.74
In 1991, the President's Council on Competitiveness proposed a number
of regulatory reform measures aimed at expediting FDA approval of INDs
("PCC Recommendations")." Some of the PCC Recommendations suggested
67. Id § 312.7(d)(1).
68. Investigational New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Drug Product Regulations; Procedures for
Drugs Intended to Treat Life-Threatening and Debilitating Illnesses, 53 Fed. Reg. 41,515 (1988) (codified
at 21 C.F.R. §§ 312, 314).
69. The 1988 Procedures include related changes that go beyond the purview of this Article's
analysis. For example, the procedures permit sponsors to engage in clinical testing without the use of
placebo control groups when alternative effective therapies can be used for comparison and control. 53
Fed. Reg. 41,519 (1988).
70. 21 C.F.R. §312.80.
71. FDA Announces Interim Regulations to Speed Marketing of Promising Drugs, AIDS POL'Y &
LAW, Nov. 2, 1988, at I.
72. 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.82(a), 312.82(b) (1988).
73. Id.
74. 53 Fed. Reg. 41,523 (1988).
75. Recommendations to Speed Drug Approvals Issued. [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Food Drug Cosm.




official recognition and formalization of processes already in place, such as
external review of IND applications76 and expanded use of advisory committees
and institutional review boards to advise research teams." Other subsequently
adopted PCC Recommendations include accelerated approval processes78 and
the use of surrogate markers as evidence of effectiveness.79
One reform measure contained in the PCC Recommendations that is still
under consideration would enhance U.S. recognition of foreign drug approvals.0
The PCC Recommendations suggest a number of measures for integrating
international drug approval processes into the U.S. system
to avoid redundancy and create regulatory efficiencies. These measures include
automatic approval of drugs that have been approved by a country with which
the U.S. has a reciprocity agreement8' and the development of common research
and drug approval standards across nations.82 The most recent related proposals
would allow use of animal test data from Japan and the EEC in FDA review
processes,83 and joint review of drugs by the FDA and foreign counterpart
agencies in Japan, Australia, and the EEC.84
Early in 1992, the Public Health Service issued a Policy Statement ("PHS
Policy") providing for expanded availability of INDs for the treatment of AIDS
and other HIV-related diseases through a "parallel track" mechanism. Parallel
track studies86 run concurrently with traditional studies. While traditional
clinical trials require classical experimental control groups, parallel track studies
can be conducted without the use of experimental controls.87 The vehicle of
sub-experimental quality trials expands access to experimental drugs to those
who cannot be included in the limited number of slots available in the
concurrent clinical investigation. While the parallel track trials were established
primarily to expand access of AIDS patients to INDs, 8 physicians who provide
76. Id. at 43,621.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 43,622.
79. ld
80. Id. at 43,623.
81. Id. According to the proposal, reciprocity would be "negotiated on a country-by-country basis."
The PCC Recommendations suggest beginning with two or three countries believed by FDA to have
approval processes that meet FDA safety and effectiveness goals. Id.
82. Id.
83. Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. 42,806 (Aug. 31, 1992).
84. Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep. 43,126 (Dec. 28, 1992).
85. 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250 (1992). While the logic of a parallel track probably applies to other diseases,
the PHS Policy is initially limited to AIDS and other HIV-related diseases. The Policy suggests that
expansion to other life-threatening diseases may be forthcoming. Id.
86. Parallel track studies were initiated in 1976 by the National Cancer Institute to grant expanded
early access to some cancer treatment drugs. Under that program, the National Cancer Institute bore the
cost of manufacture and distribution of associated drugs, and physicians were required to collect and
submit data. For discussion of these studies, see David W. Barry, A Perspective on Compassionate
Parallel Track Category C Treatment Track IND Procedures, 45 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 347 (1990).
87. 57 Fed. Reg. 13,256 (1992).
88. 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250 (1992).
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parallel track treatment are required to report safety and efficacy data to the
drug's sponsor.8 9 The parallel track thereby provides non-controlled information
to clinical trial investigators. Sponsors are required to monitor both the safety
and the data generation aspects of parallel track protocols.9°
Sponsors must apply to the FDA for approval of expanded access via
parallel track.9 Parallel track proposals will ordinarily include detailed protocols
of both the expanded availability and the controlled clinical trials.92 The
proposal review criteria include: (a) evidence of safety and efficacy; (b)
sufficient data for recommending starting dosage; (c) preliminary
pharmacokinetic and dose-response data; (d) indications that a described and
defined population lacks a satisfactory alternative therapy; (e) assurance of
manufacturer willingness and ability to support production at adequate levels
to supply both controlled clinical trials and expanded availability studies; (f)
FDA approval of Phase II controlled clinical protocols; (g) assessment of the
effect of a parallel track on controlled clinical trial enrollments; (h) a proposal
for monitoring the progress of the controlled trials; and (i) evidence of efforts
to assure that both patients and physicians will have information sufficient to
assess risks and benefits of participation in the parallel track.93
Each protocol for expanded availability must include criteria for patient
eligibility. 94 Expanded availability is limited to persons having HIV-related
illnesses for which there is no effective or tolerable standard treatment,95 and
who cannot participate in the controlled clinical trials for any of several
prescribed reasons.96 If quantities of investigational drugs are inadequate to meet
parallel track demand, protocols are expected to specify "patient priority
categories" for the assessmentof treatment preferences. 97 While the PHS Policy
does not require sponsors to obtain FDA approval to charge parallel track
recipients for treatment, sponsors must "specify the extent of economic support
89. 57 Fed. Reg. 13,258 (1992).
90. Id
91. 57 Fed. Reg. 13,257 (1992). Applications are referred to the AIDS Research Advisory Committee
("ARAC"), which makes a recommendation to the Director of the National Institute of Allergy and
Infectious Diseases ("NIAID"). The Director of NIAID then makes a recommendation, through the
Director of the National Institutes of Health ("NIH"), to the Commissioner of the FDA. Sponsors can





96. 57 Fed. Reg. 13,257 (1992). Acceptable reasons for inability to participate in controlled clinical
trials are "(a) The patient does not meet the entry criteria for the controlled clinical trials, or (b) The
patient is too ill to participate, or (c) Participation in controlled clinical trials is likely to cause undue
hardship (e.g. travel time) as defined by the protocol, or (d) The controlled clinical trials are fully
enrolled." Id.




they would be willing to provide to pursue the expanded access of the
investigational agent through the parallel track."98
In December 1992, the FDA issued yet another set of regulatory
amendments (" 1992 Amendments") intended to expedite approval of new drugs
and biological products for the treatment of serious or life-threatening
diseases. 99 Under the 1992 Amendments, full FDA approval for marketing can
be granted based on a showing of "meaningful therapeutic benefit compared
to existing treatment"'0°  through the application of "surrogate markers."''
Surrogate markers are indices of health that may indirectly suggest a drug's
effectiveness by virtue of a valid and reliable correlation to clinical benefits.
10 2
For example, surrogate markers among those who test positive for HIV include
the number of particular immune cells or the amount of particular viral antigens
present in the blood." 3 For example, blood concentrations of CD4 immune cells
are considered by some scientists to be reliable indicia of health among the HIV
infected."° Two new AIDS drugs, DDI and DDC, were approved under the
1992 Amendments using CD4 counts as surrogate markers.0 5
Sponsors of drugs that are granted accelerated approval based on surrogate
markers are required to conduct post-marketing clinical studies "necessary to
ascertain the actual clinical benefit of the drug on such endpoints as survival,
98. Id
99. 21 C.F.R. pt. 314, §§ 601.40-601.45 (1993), see also 57 Fed. Reg. 58,942 (1992).
100. 57 Fed. Reg. 58,942 (1992).
101. Id ("Accelerated approval will be considered in two situations: (1) When approval can be
reliably based on evidence from adequate and well-controlled studies of the drug's effect on a surrogate
endpoint that reasonably suggests clinical benefit or on evidence of the drug's effect on a clinical endpoint
other than survival or irreversible morbidity, pending completion of studies to establish and define the
degree of clinical benefits to patients; and (2) when FDA determines that a drug, effective for the
treatment of a diseased person, can be used safely only if distribution or use is modified or restricted.")
Id. The final regulatory language adopted states, "FDA may grant marketing approval for a new drug
product on the basis of adequate and well-controlled clinical trials establishing that the drug product has
an effect on a surrogate endpoint that is reasonably likely, based on epidemiologic, therapeutic,
pathophysiologic, or other evidence, to predict clinical benefit or on the basis of an effect on a clinical
endpoint other than survival or irreversible morbidity." 21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (1993).
102. The FDA defines a surrogate marker as "a laboratory measurement or physical sign that is used
in therapeutic trials as a substitute for a clinically meaningful endpoint that is a direct measure of how
a patient feels, functions, or survives and that is expected to predict the effect of the therapy." 57 Fed.
Reg. 13,235 (1992).
103. Elizabeth Schaefer, AIDS Politics Change Rules, NATURE, Jan. 17, 1991, at 187.
104. For a discussion of recent criticism of the validity of using CD4 counts as surrogate markers
of health among persons with HIV, see Marsha F. Goldsmith, HIV/AIDS Early Treatment Controversy
Dues New Advice But Questions Remain, 270 JAMA 295, (1993). See also Jean-Pierre Aboulker & Ann
Marie Swart, Preliminary Analysis of the Concord Trial, 341 LANCET 889, (1993) ("Concorde has not
shown any significant benefit from the immediate use of zidovudine compared with deferred therapy in
symptom-free individuals in terms of survival or disease progression, irrespective of their initial CD4
count. The discrepancy between this result and the significant effect of immediate zidovudine on CD4
counts casts doubt on the value of using changes over time in CD4 counts as a predictive measure for
effects of antiviral therapy on disease progression and survival.").
105. Weighing the Benefits, MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, Sept. 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, MACLEH file.
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disease complications, or longer-term symptoms." ' 6 The 1992 Amendments
provide as well for withdrawal of approval under a number of conditions,
including failure to engage in required post-marketing clinical studies and
failure of post-marketing clinical studies to verify clinical benefit." 7 If a drug's
safety can only be assured by restricted use or distribution, the FDA can restrict
distribution "to certain facilities or physicians with special training or
experience."' 0'8 In addition, the FDA can condition distribution "on the
performance of specified medical procedures."' 9 Conditions of and restrictions
on distribution are intended to function as protective procedures "under which
beneficial but highly toxic drugs can be approved for marketing."" '0 The FDA
anticipates that the exercise of these distribution restrictions will be rare."'
These FDA changes directly and expressly seek to accelerate the
availability of some AIDS treatments under limited conditions. Likewise,
Congress has enacted legislation intended to expedite lab-to-market time frames
indirectly. In 1992, Congress passed the Prescription Drug User Fee Act ("User
Fee Act"), authorizing the FDA to collect reviewing fees from drug sponsors.'
The User Fee Act permits the FDA to assess three kinds of fees: human drug
application and supplement fees;" 3 prescription drug establishment fees;" 4 and
106. 57 Fed. Reg. 13236 (1992).
107. Id. Withdrawal of accelerated approval is authorized under the 1992 Amendments if "(1) A
postmarketing clinical study fails to verify clinical benefit; (2) The applicant fails to perform the required
postmarketing study with due diligence; (3) Use after marketing demonstrates that postmarketing
restrictions are inadequate to ensure safe use of the drug product; (4) The applicant fails to adhere to the
postmarketing restrictions agreed upon; (5) The promotional materials are false or misleading; or (6) Other
evidence demonstrates that the drug product is not shown to be safe or effective under its conditions of
use." 21 C.F.R. § 314.530 (1993).
108. 21 C.F.R. § 314.520 (1993); 21 C.F.R. § 601.42 (1993).
109. 21 C.F.R. § 314.520 (1993); 21 C.F.R. § 601.42 (1993).
110. 57 Fed. Reg. 13,234 (1992).
111. 57 Fed. Reg. 58,942-43 (1992).
112. Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (1992). The legislation authorizes fee waiver or reduction
under stipulated conditions: when "(1) such waiver or reduction is necessary to protect the public health,
(2) the assessment of the fee would present a significant barrier to innovation because of limited resources
available to such person or other circumstances, [and] (3) the fees to be paid by such person will exceed
the anticipated present and future costs incurred by the Secretary in conducting the process for the review
of human drug application for such person." §763(d), 106 Stat. at 4496.
The legislation also authorizes a "small business exception" under which employers of fewer than
500 pay only one-half of the human drug application fee. §736 (b)(2), 106 Stat. 4495-96,
Critics suggest that the incremental cost of drug development attributable to FDA reviewing fees
may discourage or prohibit research and development projects among all pharmaceutical firms. See Danni
Sabota, Biotech Firms Brace for New FDA User Fees, HOUSTON BUS. J., Oct. 19, 1992, § 1, at I (observing
that user fees may create an insurmountable financial impediment to start-up and young biotechnology
and biomedical firms that do not yet have a product on the market). They argue that this detrimental
impact will be greatest upon smaller firms, which are least capable of bearing an additional financial
burden, and which are vital and essential contributors to the development of new drugs. This burden on
small manufacturers will be significant since the "small business exception" covers just one of the three
kinds of fees established under the User Fee Act, and in that case, provides only for a reduction, rather
than elimination, of the fee.
113. § 736(a)(1), 106 Stat. at 4494, One half of this fee is paid when the new drug application is




prescription drug product fees." 5 The revenues generated by the fees will be
used to hire more examiners," 6 thereby expediting the review process for all
drugs."1
7
Although FDA reforms of the 1980s and 1990s expanded access to
prescription drugs, the availability of less traditional treatments, such as herbs
and supplements not classified as drugs, may soon become more limited. In
early 1993, the FDA proposed stricter controls on over-the-counter nutritional
supplements ("1993 Proposals"), under which many alternative treatments
would be regulated like prescription drugs and subjected to testing and approval
procedures." 8 The FDA contends that greater control over alternative treatments
is necessary to ensure public safety, citing reports of "serious illnesses
associated with certain herbal and other botanical supplements.""I9 Some of the
concern regarding treatment with vitamins, amino acids, and herbs arises from
the proliferation of underground "buyers' clubs," formed in recent years to gain
access to treatments for HIV illness that are unavailable in the United States. 1
20
While the FDA has adopted a lenient policy towards AIDS treatment buyers'
clubs since the late 1980s, 12 1 casualties purportedly associated with products
such as Compound Q, brought into the United States from China, have
rekindled concerns that the FDA may have abdicated too much authority in the
face of pressure from activist groups.
12
which clinical data... with respect to safety and effectiveness are required," fees increase gradually from
$100,000 in 1993 to $233,000 in 1997. § 736(a)(l)(A)(i), 106 Stat. at 4494; § 736(b)(1), 106 Stat. at
4495. For drug applications "for which clinical data with respect to safety or effectiveness are not
required" fees increase gradually from $50,000 in 1993 to $116,000 in 1997. § 736(a)(1)(A)(ii), 106 Stat.
at 4494; § 736(b)(1), 106 Stat. at 4495.
114. § 736(a)(2), 106 Stat. at 4494-95, codified at 21 U.S.C.S. 379h (1993). This fee is assessed
to owners of prescription drug establishments (i.e., the Use Fee Act's terminology designating
manufacturers of prescription drugs) annually, and is scheduled to rise each year from 1993 ($60,000
per establishment) through 1997 ($138,000 per establishment). § 736 (b)(l), 106 Stat. at 4495.
115. §736(a)(3), 106 Stat. at 4495, This fee is a recurring annual fee imposed upon each approved
prescription drug product. The fee is scheduled to increase annually between 1993 ($6,000 per product)
and 1997 ($14,000 per product.) § 736(b)(1), 106 Stat. at 4495.
116. The Act will result in the hiring of six hundred new FDA employees, who will expedite drug
approval processes. Committee Passes Pharmaceutical Measure Designed to Improve Approval Processes,
DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Sept. 21, 1992, at 183.
117. See David M. Halbfinger, Drug Companies See Benefit in the User Fees They Will Pay,
PHILADELPHIA BUS. J., Nov. 30, 1992, § 1, at I (citing executives within the pharmaceutical industry who
believe that the expedited review made possible by assessment of user fees will ultimately redound to
both public and business interests).
118. 58 Fed. Reg. 33,690 (1993).
119. Id. at 33,690.
120. Mike McKee, Notes from Underground. Buyers' Clubs Feel Heat, RECORDER, July 29, 1993,
atll.
121. FDA Commissioner Frank Young authorized a policy in the late 1980s, under which AIDS
patients have been permitted to bring AIDS treatments sold abroad into the United States, provided they
are for personal use only. Joshua Hammer, The AIDS Underground. Herbs, Hormones, and Smuggling
Runs Overseas, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1989, at 50.
122. Id
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The 1993 Proposals have been criticized by both conservative politicians
and AIDS activists. Senate Bill 784, which would derail FDA efforts to control
nutritional supplements by increasing NIH advisory and evaluative authority,
12 3
has received support from such unlikely allies as Republican Senator Orrin
Hatch and San Francisco ACT UP.'24 Hatch casts his objections in the language
of market autonomy.'25 AIDS activists couch their concerns in terms of
HIV+/PWA access to promising treatments, suggesting that regulation that
constrains legal access will force patients to resort to bootleg variants, the price
of which will rise because the products cannot pass safely through legal
distribution channels.'26 They also cite anecdotal information that suggests that
many recipients of alternative treatments have become long-term AIDS
survivors."' Proponents of holistic medicine are also opposed to the FDA
proposal, suggesting that it reflects a bias in the traditional medical and
pharmaceutical industries in favor of drugs over preventive and nutritional
holistic alternatives that ostensibly help the body to heal itself.28
Taken together, the recent modifications of drug testing and approval
examined in this section constitute a substantial change brought about by
Congress and the FDA to meet the needs of increasingly vocal public
constituencies. Reform has resulted in some change for the better and some
change for the worse; some modifications go too far and some not far enough.
To comprehend the particular strengths and weaknesses of drug approval
reforms, it is necessary to examine and evaluate various broad policy
approaches to drug testing and control.
II. Options for Drug Access Policy: Paternalism, Open Access, and
Contractarianism
The history of pharmaceutical regulation in the United States, and of the
regulation of AIDS-related pharmaceuticals in particular; reflects a tension
among three models of drug access. Paternalism, or regulation that seeks to
protect the public against risk from unproven drugs, has been the driving force
behind the traditional model of drug regulation historically embodied in FDA
policy. In recent years, this philosophy has been subjected to growing criticism,
123. S. 784 103 Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
124. Mike McKee, Odd Alliance Fights FDA Plan: ACT UP and Orrin Hatch Want to Prevent
Agency from Regulating Alternative Treatments, RECORDER, July 29, 1993, at 1.
125. "In our free market society, consumers should be able to purchase dietary supplements, and
companies should be able to sell those products so long as the labeling and advertising are truthful, non-
misleading and there exists a reasonable scientific basis for product claims." Id.
126. Id
127. Id
128. See id. (quoting holistic health educator Carola Burroughs) ("[FDA is] narrowly focused on





specifically in regard to its application to the approval of AIDS treatments.
AIDS advocates and other critics have argued that regulatory paternalism is
harmful to HIV+/PWAs. They propose that the FDA should adopt an "open-
access" model that would provide all HIV+/PWAs with unfettered access to
all drug treatments, proven or unproven. This Part outlines the philosophies
underlying these models and discusses their basic shortcomings. Ultimately, the
analysis suggests that neither of these models resolves the moral and logistical
problems of treatment access in the context of the AIDS epidemic. Instead,
from both ethical and policy perspectives, a third approach-a contractarian
model-is best.
The FDA has traditionally taken a paternalistic approach to the control of
drug access, focusing almost exclusively on protecting patients from exposure
to dangerous or ineffective forms of treatment. The FDA occupies a role in loco
parentis, setting boundaries within which physicians, patients, and producers
of pharmaceuticals can engage in market transactions.12 9 Patients can only
receive medications that have been granted government approval. Doctors must
limit their treatment of patients to this same group of approved drugs, which
can be prescribed only for approved purposes. And drug companies are
permitted to sell drugs, through the intermediary of physician prescription, only
when those drugs have received FDA approval. The professional and
commercial relations that exist among doctor, patient, and drug producer are
thereby constrained by the paternal decisions of the FDA.
The recent changes in drug regulation discussed in the preceding Part have
reduced or eliminated impediments to speedy drug access, evincing some
movement away from the paternalistic model. Nonetheless, drug regulation in
the United States remains essentially paternalistic, even in regard to drugs for
the treatment of life-threatening and deadly diseases. Critics of the treatment
IND provision, parallel track, and other recent modifications continue to support
the traditional model, wherein access to drugs is strictly controlled both prior
to and after the meticulous testing processes that characterized the pre-AIDS
129. For discussion of the specific legislative and regulatory provisions that embody this approach,
see supra part I.A.
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FDA. 3 ° These critics have questioned the FDA's approval of specific drugs, 3'
and the expedited procedures that have led to those approvals.'
Regulatory paternalists also invoke the specter of fraud associated with
open access. Deregulation of stringent drug access laws may open markets to
charlatans able to prey on the desperation of some patients. One observer notes
that "[c]ancer health frauds of the '60s and '70s have turned into the AIDS
health frauds of the '80s and '90s," suggesting that a multi-billion dollar
industry has arisen in the sale of ineffective treatments. 133 While fraudulent
schemes can be prohibited and monitored and the perpetrators prosecuted
without limiting the access of the AIDS community to experimental drugs,
more schemes are likely to slip through the cracks under a policy of open
markets.'34
In contrast to the paternalistic approach, the open-access model is built on
a vision of unconstrained patient autonomy and self-determination.'13 Open-
130. A representative of Public Citizen, a consumer advocacy group, has criticized the recent
changes. FDA Radically Reorients Drug Approval Route, 240 CHEMICAL MARKETING REP., No. 21, Nov.
18, 1991, at 3, 31 (quoting Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Director, Public Citizen's Health Research Group) ("[recent
FDA modifications are] likely to result in serious injuries and deaths to patients.")
131. Recent research findings that cast doubt on the treatment value of many common applications
of AZT have led some physicians to question the expedited procedures under which AZT was originally
approved. Weighing the Benefits, MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour, Sept. 6, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, MACLEH file (quoting Dr. Deborah Cotton of the Harvard School of Public Health) ("To have
drugs come out without being really solidly proven to work meant that we'd be taking on a lot of drugs
with different kinds of side effects and not enough knowledge about how they worked, or how best to
put them together, so that we'd end up in a situation with a lot of choice, which is what we have now,
but without any way of really making decisions about which one is best.")
132. A New York Times article notes that the U.S. procedures for approving AIDS treatments have
become less stringent than British procedures, under which the FDA-approved treatment DDI has been
rejected. Lawrence K. Altman, AIDS Study Casts Doubt on Value of Hastened Drug Approval in US.,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1993, at C3.
Moreover, recent evidence suggests that the use of CD4 counts as proxy indicators of clinical
effectiveness of AIDS treatments may be flawed. See Goldsmith, supra note 104. DDI was approved under
the 1992 accelerated procedures using CD4 counts as surrogate markers. Regulatory paternalists have new
fodder to support their argument that accelerated approval procedures may result in sloppy short-cuts and
increased error, ultimately increasing the number of dangerous and ineffective treatments approved for
marketing. Critics of the recent FDA amendments are likely to contend that the erosion of regulatory
paternalism, largely in response to political pressure by AIDS activists, has gone too far, too fast. Adverse
consequences of AIDS treatments dispensed as treatment INDs without sufficient evidence of clinical
efficacy will inevitably fuel still more criticism of movements away from paternalism. The controversy
is just beginning.
133. Mike McKee, In AIDS Fight, Scams and Hope Compete, LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 6, 1992, at 2
(quoting Mark Madsen, Director of Physician Education at the California Medical Association).
134. Free markets may create breeding grounds for fraud. However, given the centrality of the free
market in the American capitalist economy, it is necessary to find less intrusive means of controlling fraud
than the inhibition of otherwise desirable transactional freedoms. For example, enhanced enforcement
of anti-fraud legislation can address unfortunate cases of deception or exploitation without hampering
increased access to legitimately promising drugs.
135. These interests are also vital to the contractarian model, and will be discussed in greater detail
in the subsection that follows.
AIDS Drugs
access approaches to AIDS drug treatment 36  emphasize
the purported right of patients to receive their choice of medication, 37 either
in tandem with physician recommendation or, alternatively, in the absence of
physician approval. The exigency of AIDS is offered as the foundation for this
extraordinary right to complete and unfettered access to drugs. If desperate
situations justify desperate measures, then the prognosis of a disease as
pernicious as AIDS may justify extreme deference to the patient's autonomy,
and the recognition of the broadest possible range of individual rights.
Open-access arguments are further strengthened by the claim that the
stringent drug review processes of the 1962 Amendments fail to achieve the
ultimate goal of the paternalistic model: the pursuit of public health and safety.
To the extent that paternalism fails to meet this objective, it is an unjustifiable
incursion upon individual freedom and autonomy. Arguably, the paternalistic
model does indeed fail in its pursuit, as net public benefit from protection
against unproven drugs is outweighed by the net public cost of the timely denial
of effective treatments.
138
Although the open-access philosophy is tempting, it is fraught with both
philosophical and practical difficulties. The open-access model arguably
conflicts with the right of autonomy held by patent holders and patent seekers.
A regulatory obligation to provide extra-experimental treatment also creates an
incremental burden for those trying to develop new drugs commercially. Any
136. The question of open access is complex and can be addressed at a number of important levels.
This Article addresses the issue of legal access: to what extent are consumers permitted to purchase or
receive the pharmaceutical products they choose, within the framework of a voluntary transaction between
patient and manufacturer? Implicit in this conception of access is a fundamental acceptance of capitalist
markets and their ability to distribute goods in a manner generally considered acceptable within a
democratic society.
The traditionally high prices of AIDS drugs create financial barriers. As a result, real (as opposed
to legal) access to AIDS drugs may be impaired by inability to pay. For a discussion of some of the issues
associated with the just distribution of AIDS treatments from the perspective of real access, see Steven
R. Salbu, AIDS and Drug Pricing: In Search of a Policy, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 691, 714-19 (1993).
Constraints upon ability to pay are compounded by insurance-related access issues. As AIDS cases
tend to be concentrated among socially marginalized groups, many patients lack medical insurance
necessary to pay for expensive treatments. Moreover, access is limited even among the insured, because
private health insurance plans usually exclude coverage of experimental treatments. Mark Scherzer, Private
Insurance, in AIDS LAW TODAY: A NEw GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 404,422 (Scott Burris, et al., eds.) (1993).
Another conception of access, one that challenges the basic effectiveness of our capitalist market
in its present form, recognizes that AIDS is becoming a disease that disproportionately afflicts
disadvantaged groups such as women, racial and ethnic minorities and intravenous drug users.
137. Some commentators suggest that this right falls within the fundamental constitutional right to
privacy, such that it can be abrogated only by showing of a compelling state interest. See, e.g., People
v. Privitera, 591 P.2d 919, 931 (Cal. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (Chief Judge Bird, dissenting).
Others have suggested that the right may be subsumed under the Fifth Amendment guarantee that
persons not be "deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Bret L. Lansdale, Essay,
A Procedural Due Process Attack on FDA Regulations: Getting New Drugs to People with AIDS, 18
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 417, 421 (1991) (quoting the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution).
138. Mark A. Kassel, Note, Getting There With the Best: The Need to Shorten the Prescription Drug
Approval Process, 27 VAL. U. L. REv. 95, 99-102 (1992) (citing U.S. mortality and morbidity costs
associated with delays in access to drugs available years earlier in other world markets).
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such burden will tend to discourage experimentation by drug manufacturers.
Furthermore, some drug companies lack the resources necessary to produce
sufficient quantities of each experimental drug to provide both experimental
and extra-experimental treatment.'39
Ultimately, while the interests of patient autonomy are certainly
compelling, autonomy in a free market system does not grant the individual a
right to anything he or she desires. Rather, autonomy in capitalist markets must
incorporate a respect for the autonomy of others, so that freedom is embodied
in the right to enter consensual transactions without undue government
constraint. This view of autonomy leads us to a contractarian model as the best
means of balancing the individual freedom and dignity of HIV+/PWAs with
both the interests of manufacturers and the social and economic benefits of the
free market.
III. A Contractarian Model for the Development of Ethical, Humane, and
Effective Access to HIV+/AIDS Drug Treatments
Freedom of contract is the best mechanism for reducing regulatory
coercion that impinges upon individual autonomy while preserving private
industry's right to self-determination. A contractarian model of drug
regulation'40 begins with the assumption that HIV+/PWAs are capable of
autonomous decisions about their own treatment. Under the model, drug
companies would be authorized to sell experimental AIDS treatments to
HIV+/PWAs with no restriction other than the requirement of physician
prescription. Physician prescription would be the only permitted interference
in otherwise entirely voluntary contractual arrangements. As a condition of any
transaction in a treatment unapproved by the FDA, HIV+/PWAs could be
required' 4' to sign an informed, voluntary waiver of liability covering
prescribing physicians, manufacturer-suppliers, or both. Such waivers would
be judicially enforceable under express legislative or regulatory provision.'42
139. Pharmaceutical companies sometimes must invest considerable time and money before they
achieve sufficient plant capacity to manufacture enough drugs to meet total demand. See, e.g., Marilyn
Chase, Biotech Breakout: Demandfor MS Drug May Help Chiron Corp. Emerge From the Pack: Lottery
Will Say Who Gets Product, One of Several That Hold Much Promise, Surprise Payofffrom Cetus, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 1, 1993, at Al, A9 (discussing Chiron's logistical inability to manufacture enough of
promising new MS drug to meet total demand during first several years of production).
140. In general, contract-based regulatory models are sometimes referred to under the label of
"contractarianism," according to which regulatory roles are supplanted by an increased reliance upon
individual exchange decisions. For a discussion of contractarian alternatives to regulation, see generally
Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395, 1395-1774 (1989).
141. This requirement would not be imposed by law or regulation; rather, in a free and open
marketplace, both physicians and manufacturer-suppliers should be free to require informed waiver as
a condition of their voluntary participation in the transaction.
142. Meaningful assurance that waivers will be respected and recognized is necessary, because




AIDS drug sales would be substantially deregulated under the proposed system,
and the range of private contracting decisions143 between manufacturers and
consumers would be expanded considerably.
The contractarian model satisfies to a significant extent three essential
policy objectives that pull in different directions. These policy objectives,
discussed individually in the sections that follow, are (A) the protection of the
rights and interests of the individual (in this instance, of the HIV+/PWA); (B)
the preservation of corporate autonomy; and (C) the promotion of the state's
interest in public health.
A. Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Individual
The interests of HIV+/PWAs should inform government regulation of the
development and distribution of AIDS drugs. Given the urgency of the
HIV+/PWA's needs, society must resist efforts to sacrifice their interests as
individuals, even in the face of efforts to benefit society as a whole. A policy
that seeks to protect the rights of individuals, in this case HIV+/PWAs, should
be based on a recognition of personal privacy, autonomy, dignity, and respect,
and must meet the essential moral requirement that persons be treated as ends
rather than means.
A right to privacy exists regarding the choice of medical treatment. 144 This
right is not absolute, but rather is circumscribed by the state's countervailing
interest in protecting the public welfare. Courts have adopted various
approaches in balancing the right of individual autonomy against the interest
of the state. Some courts have emphasized individual interests over state
interests in cases of life-threatening diseases or conditions. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that "the State's interest ... weakens
and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion
increases and the prognosis dims."' 145 However, the Supreme Court held in
contract doctrine. For discussion of his phenomenon, see PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION
AND rrs CoNsE(JENczs (1988X WALTER K. O.soN, DiE LmGAnoN Exr'ixBoN: WHAT HAPPEED WHE AmERiCA
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991).
Courts must respect patients' assumptions of super-normal risks if the market is to accord patients
reasonable rights to self-determination. Without the assurance that they will be exonerated from product
liability, manufacturers would be foolhardy to dispense unapproved drugs in deference to some abstract
ideal of patient autonomy. In other words, the contractual system will work only if the courts respect all
consensual, risk-shifting arrangements by which patients assume the full burdens of their decisions.
143. The arguments herein presume a libertarian consent model of contractual exchange, according
to which legitimacy of obligation is a function of (a) entitlement to transfer and (b) intent to transfer.
For explanation of the consent model of contract, see Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency
Law with Contract Theory, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1969, 1978-79 (1987).
144. For discussion of patient autonomy rights in the choice of treatment generally, see Judith F.
Daar, A Clash at the Bedside: Patient Autonomy v. A Physician's Professional Conscience, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 1241 (1993).
145. Matter of Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976).
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Rutherford v. United States that the state's interests can trump those of even
terminally ill cancer patients. In Rutherford, the Court held that terminally ill
patients do not have a right to purchase the unapproved drug laetrile, even in
light of trial evidence suggesting that the drug is nontoxic and even effective.1
46
Justice Marshall's opinion focused on the FDA's intent in the process of policy
implementation, observing that "the FDA has never made an exception for
drugs used by the terminally ill." Furthermore, Marshall supported the FDA's
statutory authority: "To accept the proposition that the safety and efficacy
standards of the [law] have no relevance for terminal patients is to deny the
Commissioner's authority over all drugs, however toxic or ineffectual, for such
individuals."' 47 While the opinion did not expressly address the privacy interests
of the plaintiffs, Marshall's confirmation of the broad authority of the FDA to
monitor all drugs suggests by implication that such interests are either limited,
or else insufficiently compelling to erode FDA control.'48
Other decisions that bear on this issue suggest that fundamental privacy
rights do not provide terminally ill patients with a constitutional right of
autonomous choice of treatment. While the Supreme Court in Whelan v. Roe
defined privacy in terms of "the interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions,"'49 it also noted that the realm of this interest has
been limited to "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, and child rearing and education."'5 In People v. Privitera,'' the
Supreme Court of California cited Whelan to suggest that patients' access to
laetrile or other medical treatments does not fall within the sphere of privacy,'52
and can therefore be impeded by state interests under a rational basis standard.
Thus, while the Court in Rutherford failed to address the privacy question
expressly, it is unlikely that HIV+/PWA access to unapproved drug treatment
would be considered constitutionally protected.'53 Nevertheless, Congress and
146. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 548 (1979).
147. Id. at 557-58.
148. For commentary on Rutherford, see David L. Leitner, Laetrile and the Law: An Analysis of
Rutherford v. United States, 5 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 11 (1980); Comment, Laetrile: Supreme Court
Upholds FDA "New Drug" Classification; Still No Constitutional Right ofAccess to Unapproved Drugs,
3 DET. C.L. REv. 871 (1980).
149. 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
150. Id. at 600, n.26 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976)).
151. 591 P.2d 919 (Cal. 1979).
152. Classification of child rearing and education as more fundamentally private concerns than the
decision of a terminally ill patient regarding his or her treatment seems highly arbitrary.
Chief Justice Bird apparently concurs with this sentiment, as she states in dissent in Privitera:
"[C]hoice of [cancer] treatment [is] one of the more important decisions a person may ever make,
touching immediately on his or her being. For this reason, I believe the right of privacy, under both the
state and federal Constitutions, prevents the state from interfering with a person's choice of treatment
on the sole grounds that the person has chosen a treatment that the state considers 'ineffective."' Id. at
927.
153. Id. at 922. The purpose here is not to suggest that Rutherford should be overturned, or that the
holding in Rutherford should be limited to the sale of laetrile and not extended to AIDS drug access,




the FDA should voluntarily concede authority over those drug treatments
available to HIV+/PWAs in deference to their individual autonomy interests.
The entire class of HIV+/PWAs can rationally be exempted from FDA
regulations by virtue of the universally severe and terminal nature of AIDS.'54
Regulatory deference to individual privacy and autonomy is appropriate
not only because the stakes and risks are reduced in the instance of untreatable,
terminal diseases, but also because, ifi the case of AIDS, as in the case of any
life-threatening disease, the gap between insiders and outsiders cannot be
navigated by empathy.' This "empathic failure" is perhaps the most
compelling justification for Congress and the FDA to defer to the judgment of
individual HIV+/PWAs and abdicate their authority in this area. Empathic
failure refers to the inability of legislators and regulators to understand the
needs of a group they seek to protect. This inability can stem from the
uniqueness of the group and from a lack of metaphors or analogies that can
mediate the difference between insider and outsider perspectives. In the case
of HIV and AIDS,' legislators and regulators as a group 5 7 cannot expect to
understand what ultimately must be an extremely subjective experience, one
that falls outside the realm of the universal human condition. Having HIV or
AIDS is a special situation, and lawmakers as a body should admit that they
Privacy in Choosing Medical Treatment: Should Terminally Ill Persons Have Access to Drugs Not Yet
Approved By the Food and Drug Administration?, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 693 (1987) (supporting a
constitutional right of terminally ill patients to receive treatments that have not received FDA approval);
Jon S. Batterman, Note, Brother Can You Spare a Drug: Should the Experimental Drug Distribution
Standards be Modified in Response the Needs of Persons with AIDS?, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 191, 204-05
(1990) (suggesting that cancer and AIDS can be distinguished by virtue of greater scarcity of therapies
available to treat latter).
154. The discussion of autonomy interests includes the right of PWAs to make potentially bad
decisions under the present conditions, which include (a) severity and fatality of the disease, (b) lack of
an effective treatment or cure, (c) lack of information, and (d) high levels of risk associated with either
a decision to enter any treatment or a decision to refrain from receiving any treatment.
Under these precise conditions, respect for individual liberty includes the right to make risky
decisions, even when those decisions may not have been the best ones given hindsight. (But see Marsha
N. Cohen, Getting New Drugs to People With AIDS: A Public Policy Response to Lansdale, 18 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 471, 472 (1991) (suggesting that "deprivation of life and liberty of PWA is predicated on
the assumption that the therapies delayed by the FDA are in fact 'helpful'.") As for individual liberties,
the deprivation is complete regardless of whether the therapy is ultimately helpful or harmful. When the
future benefit of the therapy is questionable, optimization of liberty includes the ability to assume risks,
irrespective of whether that assumption eventually leads to benefit or detriment.
155. Ironically, one person who unsuccessfully sought access to an unapproved drug to treat his
father's life-threatening disease says that he received an FDA form letter beginning with the words, "We
deeply empathize." See Lochhead, supra note 15. In regard to AIDS, empathy supports a policy of
relatively greater access. PWAs are rarely observed rallying for stronger regulatory control over
experimental drugs.
156. The argument here is being applied to the specific instances of HIV and AIDS, but can logically
be extended to other conditions that meet the definitional requirements of empathic failure.
157. This argument assumes that, as a decision-making group, legislators will be comprised of a
ratio of HIV+ to HIV- members in a relatively proportionate relationship to the HIV+ to HIV- ratio of
the population at large. Accordingly, the number of decision-making HIV+ individuals who are aware
of their HIV status, and therefore potentially empathic, will be small.
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cannot cross the boundaries that define that situation, however imaginative or
sympathetic those lawmakers may be.
Paternalistic protection in the face of empathic failure demands an
enormous leap of understanding. Ultimately, the leap is impossible. The
exercise of governmental authority therefore manifests a kind of arrogance, to
wit: "While there is an essential difference between us, one that I cannot
fathom, one that had become an essential'compelling reality of your life, I will
nonetheless supplant your judgment with my own."' 8 Regardless of what the
Constitution does or does not guarantee, regardless of whether the law holds
legislators accountable for respecting the privacy and autonomy of HIV+/PWAs,
Congress and the FDA should hold themselves accountable to the highest
standards of respect for the individuals they are meant to serve. In this light,
attempts to substitute administrative judgment for the personal assessments of
responsible citizens under conditions of empathic failure form an intolerable
derogation of human dignity.'59
Respect of individuals also requires that we treat persons as ends rather
than means. 6 ° A paternalistic regulatory scheme violates this tenet. It forces
HIV+/PWAs to undertake a risk they might not choose to assume under
conditions of greater autonomy-the risk of receiving placebo treatment within
a control group. From the perspective of an HIV+/PWA as patient rather than
as subject, experimental participation infringes on personal control over
treatment options. While individuals should be allowed to choose to be part of
a randomized study, the government should not, effectively force them to do
so in order to obtain access to drugs. The loss of control experienced by the
subject of medical experimentation takes two forms: the risk of receiving
placebo treatment, and the risk of receiving a drug treatment other than that
which the patient would choose if permitted to do so without constraint.
The risk of receiving placebo treatment is a byproduct of experimental
control. Under the simplest form of research design, equal numbers of subjects
are randomly assigned to one of two groups: the treatment group and the
158. The empathic failure argument is not mitigated by the possible presence of HIV+/PWAs within
the decision-making ranks of the FDA, because the Agency acts as an institutional and organizational
entity whose members are predominantly non-HIV+/PWAs. For this reason, the FDA is essentially an
agency that falls outside the shared circle of the AIDS community. As stakeholders, their professional
claims cannot logically compare with the claims of PWAs. Because these two communities, the FDA
and PWAs, are separated by an intellectually and emotionally unbridgeable gulf, any FDA imposition
of authority without a compelling necessity is an act of arrogance in violation of the freedom, autonomy,
and privacy of the members of the AIDS community.
159. The 1987 and 1988 Amendments were initial and substantial concessions of authority by the
FDA, in deference to patient autonomy under the very peculiar conditions of AIDS in the late 1980s.
The alterations recommended in this Article are logical extensions of these concessions, and all are
justifiable under the same privacy and autonomy considerations discussed herein.
160. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, GRouNDwoRK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (H.J. Paton trans.,




control group.'' The treatment group receives the drug being tested, while the
control group receives a placebo.'62 Subjects are therefore as likely to be placed
in control groups as they are to receive the drug being tested. Within the
constraints of this process, HIV+/PWA access to innovative drug treatments
is arbitrary and precarious, and shrouded in the scientific secrecy of blind and
random assignment.
Under more complex experimental designs, patients may be randomly and
blindly assigned, typically in equal numbers, to a control group or to one of
several different treatment groups.63 For example, an experiment designed to
test drugs A, B, and C in comparison to each other and to placebo treatment
would provide for the random assignment of subjects into four groups of equal
size, receiving drug A, drug B, drug C, or a placebo. In these experiments, the
subject's risk of receiving placebo treatment is compounded by another
risk-the risk of receiving an undesired treatment. A well-informed patient may
assess drug B as desirable and drugs A and C as undesirable, based on
preclinical information available in scientific and medical literature. Moreover,
a patient may evaluate some unapproved treatments as more appropriate based
on his or her symptoms. This is particularly likely to occur in the case of
AIDS, a disease that manifests itself in a variety of ways among different
people.
Unless the FDA provides a treatment option that is not buried in regulatory
qualifications, and that is comparable to the clinical experimentation option,
HIV+/PWAs suffer significant incursions into individual dignity and respect.
The failure to provide more universal, nonpaternalistic HIV+/PWA treatment
options is a failure to recognize the individual freedom and responsibility that
are fundamental to human dignity. The approval system in its present form
eliminates the individual's option to learn all there is to know about treatments,
and to choose that treatment which seems most promising or appropriate. By
forcing patients into the maze of uncertainty created by random assignment and
experimental control, the regulatory system disempowers the individual from
dominion over one of the most fundamental of personal decisions. The process
is dehumanizing and degrading. As one commentator observes in regard to the
FDA, "They play God with us."'64
161. For a more detailed explanation of classical research control, see infra part III.C.2.
162. The assignment of.subjects into two groups is intended to acount for the "placebo" effect
common to any and all forms of treatment, whereby changes in medical condition result from the patient's
expectation of improvement. Randomizing subjects into the two groups should eliminate bias that might
otherwise result from self-selection.
163. Typically, one control group can provide comparative non-treatment data for all treatment
groups.
164. See Lochhead, supra note 15 (quoting George Rehnquist, President, Families for Alzheimer's
Rights Association).
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A paternalistic system of drug regulation also treats individuals as means
by condoning the use of experimental drugs by individuals who agree to act
as research subjects, while denying access to the same drugs for medically
supervised treatment purposes when individuals limit their status to the role of
patient. From the standpoint of means-ends analysis, for what purposes is the
state willing to allow the possible sacrifice of human health or human lives?
Under a traditional paternalistic scheme such as the 1962 Amendments,'65 the
answer is that sacrifices for the advancement of science are far more acceptable
than sacrifices for individual treatment. 66 In other words, a paternalistic system
legitimizes risk of life to advance science, but not to promote individual control
over treatment. FDA regulations that effectively protect the availability of
experimental subjects more comprehensively than they protect the availability
of risky treatments at patient behest are indicative of such paternalistic
priorities. They suggest that the agency has traditionally considered human
sacrifice as a means towards scientific knowledge to be more compelling than
human sacrifice in deference to individual treatment preferences. Given that the
risks associated with unapproved drug use are identical in the cases of clinical
trials and nonexperimental treatment, FDA receptiveness to the former and
aversion to the latter suggest that terminally ill patients have been worth more
as guinea pigs than as autonomous individuals. This observation does not
suggest that the need for experimental subjects is an inadequate rationale for
permitting the consensual participation of HIV+/PWAs in what is often risky
research. Rather, it suggests that if we are willing to condone and encourage
freely chosen and individually assumed risk-taking to achieve the advancement
of science, we should also be ready to permit patients to make comparable free
and responsible choices in regard to their own treatment.
Contractarian access to AIDS drugs would increase patient autonomy
significantly by limiting government interference to situations in which
countervailing interests demand recognition. Regulation may be necessary for
the protection of (a) the public at large; (b) non-patient stakeholders, such as
private pharmaceutical companies; and (c) patients themselves. Contractarianism
enhances the opportunities for patient self-determination by deregulating access
in a manner that preserves justifiable interests of both the public at large and
of non-patient stakeholders. It shifts responsibility for protecting the interests
of patients from the shoulders of a paternalistic government onto those of the
patients themselves. To the extent that patients can be accorded self-governance
at little or no cost to the state interest in public health or the interests of private
stakeholders, the patient's interests in privacy, autonomy, dignity and respect
should prevail.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.




B. The Preservation of Corporate Autonomy
Open access to experimental AIDS drugs, under which the autonomy
interests of the patient confer an absolute right to purchase the treatment of
choice, must be balanced against corporate autonomy interests in determining
which drugs to investigate, manufacture, and market, and under what
conditions. In a free and open market, the consumer's ability to purchase any
product is limited by a manufacturer's willingness to sell that product. The
contractarian model proposed in this part recognizes the legitimacy of both
consumer autonomy and manufacturer autonomy, such that access to AIDS
drugs must be achieved by voluntary and uncoerced agreement by both parties
to the transaction.
167
Proponents of unbridled consumer autonomy may suggest that the stakes
of HIV+/PWAs should outweigh the interests of pharmaceutical companies,
based upon the obvious exigency of fatal illness and the superiority of claims
based on life over those based on profits. These arguments might be persuasive,
except that a mandate requiring companies to provide experimental drugs to
all HIV+/PWAs would ultimately be dysfunctional to patients.
Specifically, requiring corporations to provide access to experimental drugs
to all HIV+/PWAs would probably delay some important experimentation. A
laboratory will often be able to design a reasonable, scientifically sound
experiment far more quickly than it is able to set up the manufacturing
capability to provide an experimental drug to all patients who want it. Because
reliable statistical data are ordinarily generated using samples rather than entire
populations, experimentation can proceed without the logistical, operational,
and financial planning that supports mass production. If a company were
required to provide extra-experimental access in order to engage in
experimentation, the burden of establishing production facilities and distribution
channels would likely delay much experimentation. In the end, the overall pace
167. Contract is the most powerful tool created by Anglo-American law for the preservation of the
transactional autonomy of parties to any exchange. Voluntary consensual arrangements are also self-
adjusting and self-monitoring, providing natural protections of the interests of all stakeholders. Because
the uncoerced consent of both the supplier and the purchaser are necessary to the negotiation of an
enforceable contract, each party is afforded the greatest possible bargaining scope, restricted only by the
interests of the other transactor. The free market supports deals considered acceptable by all consenting
private parties, and the public interest is protected as a by-product.
Private pharmaceutical companies must protect their own ability to engage in ongoing research
projects. Companies may refuse to make negotiation concessions likely to impede the feasibility and
profitability of longer-range projects. They must balance the provision of immediate benefits to patients
with the ability to engage in ongoing AIDS research. AIDS patients become the advocates of immediate
treatment, and pharmaceutical companies act as advocates of long-range strategic planning, including the
maintenance of promising new research activity. As AIDS patients are accorded autonomy consistent with
the autonomy of other parties to private transactions, the public receives the benefit of both ongoing AIDS
treatment and ongoing AIDS experimentation.
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of AIDS research would be retarded by regulatory fiat requiring companies to
provide open access to experimental AIDS drugs.
Moreover, burdensome requirements forcing corporations to provide access
to experimental drugs to all HIV+/PWAs might discourage private companies
from engaging in any AIDS drug experimentation at all. The same dynamic
that can impede AIDS drug experimentation can also completely derail it.
Companies will not investigate potential AIDS drugs if mandated extra-
experimental distribution becomes prohibitively costly. An open-access policy
may thus destroy the viability of some research projects. For example,
companies that lack the plant capacity to manufacture a drug in sufficient
quantities to meet demand cannot sustain open-access marketing. Likewise,
companies unwilling or unable to absorb the costs associated with mandatory
marketing of experimental AIDS drugs are likely to pursue alternative projects
that are unfettered by a mandatory marketing policy, and therefore more
strategically or financially desirable. Ultimately, the danger of compelling
pharmaceutical companies to sell experimental drugs to extra-experimental
patients is not limited to experimental delay, but may result in an overall
chilling effect upon private AIDS drug experimentation.
C. Promotion of the State Interest in Public Health
A patient's privacy rights are bounded by the state's interest in protecting
the public welfare broadly, and the public health specifically.68 Nonetheless,
the state's legitimate stake in protecting individual persons is and should be
diminished when the individual is terminally ill and there are no effective,
FDA-approved treatments.
Although the state's ability to interfere with private action is circumscribed
by these conditions, it is not eliminated. Even if the welfare of individual
HIV+/PWAs were removed entirely from the realm of state authority, public
health would remain a concern of the state. Because AIDS is an infectious
disease, privacy interests of HIV+/PWAs can never completely supplant the
state's interest in regulatory oversight.
The state has a legitimate interest in protecting the public by curtailing the
spread of AIDS. This interest is attenuated, however, in its application to
patient choice of AIDS treatments. The logical connection between treatment
options and the state interest in reducing the incidence of infection depends
upon a correlation between specific treatment options and eliminating the virus
from individuals, and thereby reducing the number of new opportunities for
infection. Since there are presently no effective treatments or cures for AIDS,
and specifically none that destroy the virus and the possibility of subsequent




transmission, an individual's decisions regarding treatment will not be more
threatening to the public health than FDA doctrine." 9 Because the government
has little practical expertise in AIDS and HIV treatment on which to based
claims of superior knowledge or experience, its position for asserting
paternalistic control is substantially weakened. The argument that the individual
must be forced to take a proven, effective drug rather than an experimental drug
of choice in order to protect self and others is ineffectual when no such
effective drug exists.
Still, given the presence of other government interests, such as the need
to control insurance costs that are spread across the population, it is reasonable
to incorporate a very limited form of restriction on the actions of both the
company and the consumer. This restrictive force should be the prescribing
physician, who can serve as an intermediary between the company and the
consumer.
While the state interest in the health of individuals is easily outweighed
by the interest of individual autonomy in a free society, the state role in
eradicating AIDS cannot be so readily dismissed. A preference ordering that
ranks individual rights higher than social expediency suggests that respect for
individuals should override the public utility derived from treating individuals
as research subjects. 7 ' This ordering suggests that the scientific and medical
communities should consider HIV+/PWAs primarily as patients to receive
treatment, and as research subjects only to the extent that the latter role is
consistent with the former. A regulatory system that optimizes individual patient
autonomy, particularly in regard to debilitating and fatal diseases, is morally
justifiable because it acknowledges this essential priority ordering, valuing basic
respect for individual rights over the interest of scientific advancement.
Moreover, the interests of scientific and medical advancement need not
be sacrificed by deregulating the consensual exchange of unapproved AIDS
treatments. There are methodologies that advance the state's interest in ongoing,
effective AIDS research and development while still preserving individual rights
to negotiate treatment with providers and suppliers. Open medical treatment
under the contractarian model is compatible with rapid applied scientific
progress.
169. In other words, the state can presently offer no HIV+/AIDS treatments that in any way reduce
infectivity of HIV. Were the state able to offer such treatments, it would have a rational argument that
the public's interest in mitigating future incidence of infection might override some autonomy interests.
Without access to a set of approved treatments that effectively reduce infectivity, the state cannot argue
persuasively that control over individual treatment is rationally related to control over future infection
rates.
170. See supra part III. A.
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1. Enhancing Clinical Trials
Opening the channels of experimental drug distribution is likely to provide
valuable information that will ultimately expedite and enhance the quality of
AIDS drug research. When the distribution of untested drugs is hastened and
expanded, the drugs will be consumed more quickly, and by greater numbers
of PWAs, than under the present system." 1 The body of informal information
will therefore develop more quickly, and the quality of that information will
be enhanced by the increased number of patients providing feedback on the use
of experimental drugs.
More specifically, large numbers of users of untested drugs will make
informal observations regarding the apparent effects of the drugs. Suppose that
ten friends share similar manifestations of AIDS. Within a month of using Drug
X, they observe that all symptoms of each of the ten friends enter remission.
They have no traditionally sound scientific basis for concluding that Drug X
is effective. However, it is not irrational to find the observation encouraging
and to report the results to the AIDS and scientific communities as well as to
the public at large. After receiving this report and similar reports from other
groups of patients, Company A, the patent holder of Drug X and twenty other
theoretically promising drugs, may decide to focus experimentation on Drug
X.
Although informal observations do not provide an adequate basis for data
analysis, they can be potent sources of both research priority strategies and
scientific hypotheses. By opening access to untested drugs in a manner that
speeds distribution and expands the pool of potential recipients, there will be
a dramatic increase in the amount of information available to HIV+/PWAs,
their physicians, and medical and scientific investigators, who can then interpret
the scientifically uncontrolled data in useful ways.
Open, extra-experimental, consensual exchanges of unapproved drugs will
not impair a corporation's ability to engage in experimentation. Specifically,
the availability of treatment INDs is unlikely to impede commercial
investigators looking for subjects. Not all reasonable patients will prefer
treatment INDs to clinical INDs. Doomsayers who predict that treatment INDs
will eliminate the pool of subjects who agree to participate in clinical trials
171. This phenomenon is already occurring, albeit outside the law. The development of an AIDS
underground has included the organization of drug smuggling rings engaged in the illegal dispersion of
drugs from Mexico and other. countries to United States PWAs. The underground responds to medical
journal reports of promising but untested treatments by sending members to countries like Mexico, where
drug access is less rigorously restricted. Anecdotal information resulting from this process is incorporated
into ongoing scientific and medical research in an interactive process, as patients, physicians, and
researchers engage in a dialogue that is responsive to promising but nonscientifically documented trends.
See generally PETER S. ARNO & KARYN L. FEIDEN, AGAINST THE ODDS: THE SAFETY OF AIDS DRUG
DEVELOPMENT, POLITICS AND PROFITS 60-70 (1992) (discussing of the AIDS Underground).
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ignore or underestimate the diversity of preference functions within the
population. Specifically, they ignore two important sources of variance that may
have substantial effects on shaping individual choice: variance in risk
assessment and variance in financial resources."'
Variance in risk assessment refers to the differences among rational
decisions that are derived from decentralized, individual calculations of
comparative risks. Different people allocate different risks to the alternatives
of treatment and nontreatment. This can be demonstrated intuitively by simply
observing the varying receptiveness of individuals to the use of pharmaceutical
medications. Some seek drug treatments for the slightest ailment, while others
avoid drugs well beyond the point at which such avoidance is probably
advisable. The chance of receiving a placebo by virtue of falling randomly in
a control group rather than an experimental treatment group will not be valued
consistently among decentralized decision-makers choosing between clinical
INDs and treatment INDs.
Of course, if variance in individual preference were simply divided
between drug users and drug avoiders, there would still be a problem finding
experimental subjects when both clinical and treatment IND options are
available. Drug users would prefer treatment INDs, and drug avoiders would
choose neither. Neither group would desire clinical INDs. Fortunately, decision-
making differences among individuals are complex, incorporating an array of
factors that allow for a rich variety of decisional combinations.'73 When we add
another layer of human variance to the drug-user/drug-avoider taxonomy, we
begin to locate possible pools of voluntary experimental subjects. Consider, for
example, differences in valuation of faith and altruism. Since a patient cannot
know whether the use of an untested drug will be helpful or detrimental, an
element of hope or faith invariably enters the decision-making process. The
tendency to place one's trust in hope or faith will of course vary among
individuals. For example, some may believe that the vicissitudes of AIDS may
best be trusted in the hands of external forces. In others, hope and faith may
combine with a strong sense of altruism. A patient may logically choose a
clinical IND over a treatment IND, reasoning that while both are risky, at least
the former will provide information that may be helpful to humanity in the
search for effective AIDS treatments. 7 4 Given the high level of uncertainty
172. The effect of variance in financial resources upon consumer choices is so firmly implanted in
neoclassical economic theory as to be axiomatic. The influence of risk propensity and risk averseness
is an important factor in modem decision theory. See KENNETH R. MACCRIMMON & DONALD A. WEHRUNG,
TAKING RISKS: THE MANAGEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY 277-95 (1986).
173. Numerous factors enter into decisions made by individuals who each have unique utility
preference functions. Because of the principle that different people value different things, humans given
choice will generally make a variety of decisions.
174. See Cheryl Clark, Private Groups Helping Test AIDS Drugs: US. Efforts Too Slow, Activists
Contend, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 11, 1993, at B I (quoting a patient who has chosen to participate
in an experiment in which he may be receiving either a treatment or a placebo: "If I don't benefit from
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surrounding either option, some HIV+/PWAs will prefer to enter
experimentation that has the potential to increase our understanding of HIV and
AIDS.
Variance in financial resources, like variance in individual risk assessment,
also serves to ensure that clinical INDs will not be undermined by treatment
INDs. Corporations can and will employ a range of incentives to make clinical
INDs attractive. Under the changes of FDA rules proposed in this Article,
companies would be granted increased latitude in determining whether to exact
reasonable fees for any INDs, either treatment or clinical.' In the unlikely
event that a company is unable to generate adequate interest in clinical trials
by virtue of preference variance within the large pool of HIY+/PWAs, it can
use incentives to generate sufficient interest. A company might charge recipients
of treatment INDs but not participants in clinical IND testing,176 or decide not
to market an IND for treatment purposes prior to FDA approval.'
Even if a substantial majority of patients prefer treatment INDs to clinical
INDs, the sheer numbers of HIV+/PWAs ensure that any reasonable research
project need not be aborted for lack of subjects. The lamentably rapid spread
of AIDS mitigates concerns regarding availability of experimental participants.
Recent CDC figures indicate that 242,000 Americans were diagnosed with
AIDS by September 1992,"'8 and that this number will increase to one-half
million by 1995.179
2. Other Approaches to Data Collection
In evaluating the effect of treatment INDs on research, we must also
reassess the arguments for reliance on classic methods of experimentation.
Rapid medical advances can be achieved both through traditional, controlled
scientific experimentation and through less traditional or pre-experimental
observation. The scientific method is crucial to the systematic development of
this, somebody else might.")
175. See infra text accompanying notes 206-212.
176. This strategy is subject to criticism for both the direct exploitation of the poor, and the indirect
exploitation of racial minorities who are over-represented among the poor. Yet the criticism is no more
compelling here than it is when lodged against our health care system in general. Under our current
system, the wealthy have the resources to purchase products or options that the poor may be unable to
afford. Nonetheless, because such undesirable class stratification will result from this incentive strategy,
companies able to generate desired experimental participation without resorting to the indirectly coercive
forces of financial exigency may prefer not to adopt a policy of charging only for treatment INDs.
177. A fundamental tenet of the proposed amendments bears reiteration: transactions in INDs are
consensual under the changes, and can only occur when both the sponsor decides to market and a
consumer decides to purchase. This means that companies, while not required to delay marketing until
final FDA approval, could decide that such delay is nonetheless necessary to generate sufficient numbers
of experimental subjects.
178. See AIDS Deaths Mount More Slowly, supra note 7.





knowledge, and is admittedly the most thorough and rigorous vehicle by which
our understanding of nature may be improved. Nonetheless, while alternative
approaches may not give the quality of information we have come to expect
from traditional experimentation, they have the potential to generate useful
information regarding the value of proposed treatments while maintaining
respect for patient/subject autonomy. These alternative methods can provide the
scientific community with suggestive information regarding the nature of
HIV/AIDS and its responsiveness to various interventions while granting
HIV+/PWAs more treatment options. Alternative methods should not replace
classically designed studies. These options should be seen as supplementary,
offering additional options to HIV+/PWAs, and allowing us to treat patients
as ends in themselves rather than as means employed in the quest for scientific
knowledge.
Biomedical research has traditionally been based on randomized, double-
blind, placebo-controlled experiments. As noted above, to provide useful
comparative information, subjects are randomly assigned either to a group that
receives the experimental treatment 6r to a control group that receives a
placebo. Randomization helps isolate the relationship between treatments and
observed effects. When subjects are randomly assigned to groups and attended
identically in all respects other than the experimental treatment, statistically
significant differences observed between groups can be inferred to result from
treatment. Randomization controls for any systematic group variance that could
confound the study. 8' For example, randomization eliminates biases that might
result from self-selection based on individual treatment preference.'
In a "double-blind" trial, neither investigators nor subjects know who has
been assigned to specific treatment and control groups. Because subjects are
not informed of their group assignments, researchers can ensure that data are
uninfluenced by subject expectations. For example, patients asked whether they
have had night sweats may be more likely to answer "yes" if they think that
180. Additionally, use of large samples reduces the likelihood of coincidental between-group
disparities.
181. When patients choose whether to take a treatment, they may base their decision on some
secondary characteristic that is extraneous to the effect of the treatment being examined. Differences in
observable results may logically be a function of either treatment differences or of secondary characteristic
differences.
For example, suppose that without random assignment, patients with Kaposi's sarcoma will tend
to take Drug A, and those with pneumocystis will tend to take Drug B, on the basis of previously untested
scientific hypotheses concerning likely effectiveness. Observations that a non-randomized group of Drug
A users are less likely to develop retinitis than a non-randomized group of Drug B users can be interpreted
in several ways. It is possible that Drug A inhibits retinitis; it is also possible that those with Kaposi's
sarcoma-the secondary characteristic-are less likely to develop retinitis than those with' pneumocystis.
When patients choose their own treatments, an infinite number of self-selection biases, both obvious and
invisible, can potentially exist. Those who examine differences cannot confidently attribute causality to
the one dimension they have chosen to examine without controlling for all other possible differences
between groups.
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they are receiving a placebo rather than a drug treatment. Investigators are also
kept ignorant of particular group assignments to prevent either intentional or
inadvertent skewing of interpretations, especially interpretations that favor
hypotheses that the investigator is hoping to prove.
For these reasons, double-blind, randomized control studies are optimal
in their ability to reduce "noise," or the presence of extraneous signals that can
be misinterpreted as effect. Because experimental controls are the best way to
demonstrate a direct and clear causal link between treatment and effect, the
clinical trials required for traditional FDA approval of new drugs are
undoubtedly the most scientifically sound means of establishing safety and
effectiveness.
Alternative means of control can be evaluated in terms of the quantity and
quality of comparative information that they provide. From the standpoint of
the quality of comparative information, placebo control of treatment groups is
the most useful means of control, t 2 followed in declining order by two non-
placebo control methods: control of a treatment group by comparing it to a
previously tested alternative treatment, 3 and control of a treatment group by
comparing it to a previously untested alternative treatment.'84 Alternatives to
the ideal of placebo. control, while imperfect, can nonetheless be a source of
medical and scientific knowledge. Moreover, they allow us to protect the
autonomy and dignity of HIV+/PWA subjects.
Testing of INDs using non-placebo controls can be achieved by comparing
the post-treatment health status of subjects who have been randomly assigned
to various treatment groups that receive different dosages of the drug being
tested.'85 A similar measure of control that permits reasonable inference can also
be derived by comparing groups of patient-subjects receiving different drug
treatments. Finally, longitudinal observational studies permit reasonable
comparisons of outcomes in individual patient-subjects over time, without the
use of placebo control. t"6 Accordingly, the FDA has suggested that placebo
182. Placebo control of treatments permits inferences regarding the effects of treatment versus
nontreatment, unconfounded by any between-group differentiation that may result from attitudinal,
physiological, or behavioral variance that may be related to knowledge regarding one's treatment status.
183. The control here is limited by the lack of a placebo baseline from which to make clean
comparisons between treatment and non-treatment. The control that does exist allows comparisons between
a treatment that has been studied, and about which information is known, and the experimental treatment.
This comparison can provide useful information as to the value of the proposed treatment relative to the
value of the tested treatment.
184. This alternative is similar to the previous one, except that the utility of neither treatment being
examined has been firmly established through use of placebo-controls. The information provided is limited
to a relative ordering of two largely unknown entities.
185. See infra text accompanying notes 193-94.





control is inappropriate for the testing of treatments for life-threatening diseases
when an effective therapy exists that can function as a non-placebo control.'87
Assigning patients with life-threatening diseases to placebo groups is not
only a denial of basic human dignity; it may also be an inadvertent source of
bad science. In order to ensure that they receive some form of treatment, some
HIV+/PWAs enrolled in placebo-controlled trials have taken their pills to
independent laboratories to have them chemically analyzed.' 88 Forthright
participation as research subjects may depend on the patient's belief that the
study serves not only the interests of science, but also the interests of the
patient. 8 9 Patients who initially agree to participate in clinical trials may feel
pressure to participate in more than one trial to obtain pills that test as
nonplacebos, thereby deceiving researchers and invalidating trial results.'"
Furthermore, some attrition that confounds the value of research findings in
randomized trials can result from a patient's disillusionment upon discovering
that he or she is receiving a placebo. Patients may also drop out of trials or fail
to comply with medication instructions if they simply come to suspect, perhaps
because they see little improvement in their health, that they are receiving a
placebo.
Investigators examining the effects of aerosolized pentamidine on the
incidence of pneumocystis carinii pneumonia ("PCP") during the late 1980s
encountered additional pragmatic limitations that foreclosed the possibility of
placebo-controlled experimentation. Intravenous pentamidine was available for
prescription, and patients could easily dissolve the product in water and use a
nebulizer to manufacture an aerosol form at home. As a result, a gray market
developed for the highly touted aerosolized pentamidine, leading researchers
to conclude that the recruitment of subjects for a placebo-controlled experiment
might be difficult.1 9'
Given these practical considerations, researchers studying aerosolized
pentamidine designed their research project in the form of "dose response
trials." This method compares dependent variable responses (here, episodes of
PCP and their severity) to different levels of treatment dosage.' 92 This technique
187. 21 CFR § 314.126(b)(2)(iv) (1993).
188. Joseph Palca, AIDS Drug Trials Enter New Age, 246 SCIENCE, Oct. 6, 1989, at 19, 20.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. A. Bruce Montgomery, How the Recent Changes in Expedited Drug Approval Procedures Affect
the Work ofa Clinical Investigator, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 339, 340 (1990). This study is an example
of an alternative method of inquiry which yielded significant and useful information as well as an
important AIDS treatment. Nonetheless, these investigators make the untenable judgement that the
availability of gray-market treatment precluded the possibility of recruiting participants for placebo-
controlled testing. As previously observed, treatment options do not necessarily eliminate the pool of
patients willing to engage in experiments in which non-treatment is a random possibility. See supra text
accompanying notes 173-180.
192. Montgomery, supra note 191.
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permits inferences regarding both relative effectiveness and relative toxicity of
various dosages. While it was initially treated with skepticism by the scientific
community,'93 the technique eventually led the FDA to approve aerosolized
pentamidine, the most successful PCP treatment presently available. By
providing all patient-subjects with some dosage of treatment, investigators
accomplish ends that simultaneously serve both patients and science. They treat
patients as ends deserving the freedom to choose to receive some dosage of a
promising treatment. Since, at some critical cutoff point, lower dosages will
actually be more effective than higher dosages, and because these cutoff points
are the unknowns to be determined in the study, patients gain no helpful
information by independently analyzing pills. Furthermore, patients are
receiving a professionally prepared version of the product, and therefore have
no incentive to choose home-grown versions. Finally, since the use of respectful
research approaches will encourage patient-subjects to comply with the
instructions they are given, designs that maximize human dignity can also add
an increment of scientific validity.
"Meta-analysis" is another technique that can supplement classic methods
of experimentation. Meta-analysis pools the data from various existing studies
for further exploration and analysis, stretching the utility of limited numbers
of clinical trials.'94 The purposes of meta-analysis are "(1) to increase statistical
power for primary end points and for subgroups, (2) to resolve uncertainty
when reports disagree, (3) to improve estimates of effect size, and (4) to answer
questions not posed at the start of individual trials.""'
Meta-analysis is potentially a valuable source of research efficiency that
may enable more respectful treatment of patients as ends rather than means,
while simultaneously preserving the ability to investigate promising new drugs.
Meta-analysis reduces the number of research subjects needed, by using each
set of clinical trial data more thoroughly and efficiently. If the data generated
in clinical trials can serve multiple functions, and can be the source of several
variants of analysis, then more extra-experimental treatment options can be
offered to patients without sacrificing the adequacy of the pool of subjects for
scientific inquiry. Through meta-analysis, we can mitigate the concern that
options like treatment INDs or parallel track trials will impoverish the quantity
and quality of AIDS research.
193. An NIH grant proposal covering this research was rejected on methodology grounds. Id at 341.
194. For early discussions of this procedure, see Gene V. Glass, Primary, Secondary, and Meta-
Analysis of Research, 5 EDUC. RESEARCHER 3 (1976); Richard J. Light & Paul V. Smith, Accumulating
Evidence: Procedures for Resolving Contradictions among Different Research Studies, 41 HARV. EDUC.
REv. 429 (1971).
195. Henry S. Sacks et al., Meta-Analyses of Randomized Controlled Trials, 316 N. ENG. J. MED.
450 (1987). The authors raise concerns regarding varying levels of quality and utility of meta-analyses,
but suggest that the process can be of value in achieving the aforementioned ends if methodological care




Real world experience, like laboratory experimentation, can inform the
process of drug evaluation. For several decades, scientists have been using
innovative statistical and design techniques that allow various inferences of
causality within the context of "field research," or research occurring outside
ideal laboratory conditions. Among the most promising is path analysis, in
which correlation coefficients can be interpreted deductively in order to infer
causal probabilities.'96 To the extent that such techniques exist, they may enable
pools of treatment IND patients to provide important scientific information.
Likewise, parallel track trials may be valuable sources of reasonably high-
quality data, notwithstanding the absence of classical experimental conditions
and controls. The expansion of these options should expedite the collection of
secondary quality statistical findings, which can then be used to assist clinical
researchers in framing more useful, better informed research questions.
Under conditions of crisis such as the AIDS epidemic, quantity of data is
extremely important. While we must provide opportunities for rigorous testing
of the most promising treatments, receptiveness to innovative and less
traditional ways of learning and understanding will open fruitful and perhaps
crucial avenues of investigation. Moreover, the utility of classical
experimentation may be impeded by the high levels of noise that exist in HIV
and AIDS research. As more HIV+/PWAs use combinations of treatments,
efforts to assign subjects to randomly selected groups in order to control for
unintended agents of causality will be frustrated. This dynamic may force
scientists to analyze all data using statistical tools that rectify failure in
experimental control, even within the context of ostensibly controlled
experimentation. As clinical and treatment data begin to share variability that
must be controlled using techniques other than randomization, the superiority
of experimental research designs over field studies is diminished. Both inside
and outside the lab, dirty data are becoming an unavoidable reality.
197
D. The Utility of the Contractarian Model for Balancing Interests.
The contractarian model balances our desire to provide HIV+/PWAs with
the greatest freedom of choice in their own medical treatment and the need to
ensure both public health and AIDS research progress. Contractarian access
preserves the autonomy of both supplier and consumer and reduces regulatory
interference by the government, thereby facilitating a maximum number of
mutually advantageous transactions. Companies that are able to provide extra-
experimental access to all patients will have the ordinary market incentives to
196. For a good discussion of path analysis, see THOMAS D. COOK& DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-
EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN & ANALYSIS FOR FIELD STUDIES 301-21 (1979).
197. For discussion of this phenomenon, see James J. Eigo, Expedited Drug Approval Procedures:
Perspectives from an AIDS Activist, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 377, 382 (1990),
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do so. Likewise, consumers will gain the freedom to enter purchasing
transactions autonomously. The preservation of freedom of contract will thus
increase the number of treatment options available for HIV+/PWAs. By
respecting not only the patient's freedom of choice, but also the manufacturer's
autonomy, an increase in drug access can be accomplished without hindering
or discouraging the ongoing experimental efforts that should be considered an
essential component of any sensible public policy.
A reasonable contractarian policy can and should place the condition of
physician prescription on both individual and corporate transactional autonomy.
The physician, is a compromise intermediary between otherwise freely
contracting parties. Doctors can provide some professional control over
treatments that may sound appealing to the relatively unsophisticated
nonprofessional, but which may be known professionally to be unsound and
unreasonably dangerous. 198 Use of doctors also decentralizes the exercise of the
state's public welfare interest, so that contractual decisions are not broadly
monitored by one central authority, but rather are watched by thousands of
professionals in consultation with their patients. This decentralization is crucial
to the maintenance of any meaningful patient autonomy, as patients will be able
to find physicians willing, after a waiver of liability, to authorize for the
terminally ill all but the most patently dangerous treatments. While some
physicians will be extremely cautious by nature, others will be willing to help
patients take reasonable risks. Utilization of medical professionals as exclusive
mediators between private contracting rights and government welfare interests
is an effective way to ensure a reasonable balance between the two.
IV. Implementing the Contractarian Model
While the recent legislative and regulatory amendments discussed in Part
II have brought the drug approval process increasingly closer to a contractarian
ideal, there is room for improvement. The following recommendations are
intended to bring the relevant laws and regulations closer to the contractarian
model.
198. The role of the doctor here is a minimal incursion upon contractarian freedom of transaction.
Because the body of medical information regarding AIDS and HIV is both voluminous and highly
complex, limited governmental regulation that requires physician prescription of unapproved drugs may
be necessary to compensate for unintended individual error that is likely to occur when information




Recommendation 1: Make treatment INDs available during all phases
of clinical testing.
The 1987 Amendment has the potential to reduce the average time frame
between the identification of promising drugs and their availability to patients
in the form of treatment INDs. By permitting treatment IND distribution
following Phase II success,199 Congress has shaved five and one-half years off
the average estimated twelve-year period from initiation of investigation to
treatment access. 200 Still, a six and one-half year average delay remains before
HIV+/PWAs gain access to a newly identified potential treatment. As
previously noted, the early stages of drug development can span many years.
The FDA's restriction of treatment INDs to the post-Phase II period under
ordinary circumstances is insupportable. Drugs approved for Phase I clinical
testing have been cleared for human experimentation, suggesting that the use
of these products by humans is reasonable and medically promising. Under the
means-ends guidelines discussed above, the FDA should never be willing to
sanction the use of people as experimental subjects, and hence as a means of
gaining scientific or medical knowledge, unless it is also willing to approve
commensurate treatment in recognition of patients' rights to be considered as
ends unto themselves. If the FDA's rational cut-off for human testing is that
point at which preclinical trials have proven promising, its cut-off for human
treatment should coincide. The government's inability to distinguish reasonably
between experimental and treatment approval thresholds renders the present
system arbitrary and untenable.
Qualification of treatment INDs prior to Phase I testing, but after
successful preclinical testing, is a better option. The FDA can reasonably
prohibit the dispensing of treatment INDs prior to the execution of successful
preclinical testing. There is, incontrovertibly, no useful information available
at this stage. Furthermore, the chances are extremely low that drugs under
preclinical testing will qualify to proceed to the clinical testing stages. Indeed,
only one in five thousand drugs proceeds, from preclinical to clinical testing.
20
'
The possible benefits of providing treatment IDs at this stage are nearly
nonexistent, while the risks are exorbitant.
Expansion of the sphere of treatment 1NDs is likely to yield increased
efficiency as a by-product. Under the existing provisions for emergency IND
approvals on an ad-hoc basis,20 2 the FDA may be required to make a prohibitive
number of custom-tailored, and therefore time-consuming and inefficient,
decisions. The emergency IND process typically entails telephone requests,
199. See Rotman, supra note 61 and accompanying text.
200. Id. at 46.
201. See Lochhead, supra note 15.
202. See sources cited supra note 62.
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made by physicians to the FDA, for special permission to provide an
unapproved treatment to a patient who has a life-threatening disease and no
alternative treatment options.2 3 Given the increasing number of HIV+/PWAs
who will meet these criteria, the incidence of emergency IND requests is likely
to increase in the future. By expanding drug eligibility for treatment IND status
to all stages of clinical trials, we would expedite the inclusion of drugs into an
efficient "blanket" category that requires only one FDA decision for a large
number of patients who meet the emergency IND criteria. The efficiency gains
that accrue thereby would permit the FDA to focus its resources on the
expedient review of other applications.
Recommendation 2: Permit pharmaceutical companies to demand
payment for both clinical20 4 and treatment INDs.
Under the 1987 Amendment, manufacturers are permitted to sell INDs only
under certain conditions.25 Companies are not ordinarily permitted to charge
subjects for drugs administered as clinical INDs. Under the norms of
commercial experimentation, the cost of supplying test products is ordinarily
borne by the sponsor.20 6 The 1987 Amendment therefore requires application
for, and FDA approval of, schemes to charge subjects for clinical INDs.
Approval is granted if necessary to underwrite clinical IND expenses, but not
for general commercial purposes.20 7 Likewise, sale of treatment INDs requires
FDA approval, which will not be granted for commercial marketing purposes.2 8
Sponsoring firms should be permitted by regulatory provision to charge
recipients of clinical and treatment INDs regardless of whether the fees are
necessary to support related research. The rationale for permitting companies
to charge for both clinical and treatment INDs is compelling, regardless of
whether sales revenues are needed to underwrite clinical expenses. A misguided
tendency to equate the sale of unapproved products with exploitation supports
the regulatory inclination to prohibit sales of experimental drugs. Yet the sale
of a relatively proven product is conceptually indistinguishable from sale of an
untested product. Under norms of contractual autonomy, buyers would be
enticed to purchase either product only because they believe that it has some
acceptable potential to deliver desirable medical results. In the case of both
203. See Cooper, supra note 62, at 335.
204. For the purpose of this discussion, reference to the ability to charge for clinical INDs refers
as well to the ability to charge for their parallel track trial counterparts.
205. See supra text accompanying note 66.
206. Lisa C. Will, Note, Accelerated FDA Approval of Investigational New Drugs: Hope for
Seriously 111 Patients, 94 DICK. L. REv. 1037, 1051 (1990).
207. Id
208. Approval for the sale of treatment INDs also requires adequate enrollment in ongoing clinical





approved and experimental drugs, the user receives a product that has been
manufactured and distributed by a private company that has a right to demand
compensation.
This right should supersede the current criteria for the sale of INDs, as it
reflects a manufacturer's need to cover expenses and make a reasonable profit.
Recognition of this right is sound public policy that will encourage research
efforts. The ability to generate revenues increases the money available for the
financing of clinical INDs, regardless of whether the money is technically
"necessary" for ongoing research. It is wise to allow companies to develop sales
revenues freely, because revenues ultimately support clinical trials of a greater
variety of drugs.
Unfortunately, by restricting charges for INDs, the 1987 Amendment
underestimates the role of the profit motive in encouraging new research
projects. Just as sales revenues that directly support appurtenant clinical IND
trials enhance the feasibility of those trials, so do sales revenues that are not
directly rechanneled into the appurtenant clinical trials nonetheless enhance the
desirability of those trials. Sales revenues also enhance both the feasibility and
the attractiveness of subsequent trials. As long as manufacturers are permitted
to sell their drugs for treatment purposes, they will have a greater incentive to
produce them and to make them available for treatment use. 209 Immediate
revenues thus act as an incentive to develop and continue clinical IND trials,
regardless of whether that incentive is in the form of essential experimental
financing or unessential, but nonetheless desirable, commercial profit. The line
drawn in the 1987 Amendment is arbitrary, and purports to distinguish between
revenue motives that are largely indistinguishable. From a policy perspective,
inward cash flows are always an incentive to continue operations and expand
into new projects, whether those cash flows are vital to progress, or simply
desirable to the organization.
Related to policy decisions regarding manufacturer charges for [NDs is the
complex question of equitable pricing in a contractarian model of constrained
regulation. In regard to both clinical and treatment IND charges, a number of
dynamics are likely to interact. Drug companies, which have not been reluctant
to charge exorbitant fees for patented HIV and AIDS treatments,2"' may show
equally little self-restraint if given free rein to establish fees for INDs. In an
open and free economy, however, the profit- maximization motive is ordinarily
modulated by competitive supply sources. If consensual transactions in
treatment [NDs for AIDS were liberalized as this Article recommends, there
would be an open market for these drugs. Likewise, the employment of parallel
track trials will hasten the development and distribution of drugs. The ability
209. See Will, supra note 207, at 1052.
210. For a detailed discussion of this problem, see Salbu, supra note 136, at 691.
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to charge exorbitant prices for treatment INDs and parallel track drugs would
be checked naturally by the forces exerted by competitor products. t ' We should
expect that opportunities for price gouging would decline in an open market
for treatment INDs and parallel track drugs when compared to the present
market for a very limited number of patented, fully approved AIDS treatments.
Ultimately, expansion of free contracting for treatment INDs and parallel
track drugs, including freedom in pricing decisions, will redound to the benefit
of patients. Whereas artificial pricing caps impose authoritarian protection'upon
consumers who may neither want nor need that protection, in a contractarian
system caps also create a compelling regulatory disincentive to corporations
considering whether to market experimental products as treatment INDs, or to
engage in parallel track trials. Artificial pricing constraints may thereby reduce
the number of options available to the consumers whose freedom of choice
should be a driving force in HIV and AIDS drug access reform.
Regulators will never be able to provide, simultaneously, the cheapest
possible treatment and the widest possible variety of treatment choices for
patients. Any regulatory policy aimed at achieving one of these ends will fall
short of the other. By relegating pricing to the free market, regulators would
allow autonomous, freely transacting consumers maximum voice in this
tradeoff. Consumer willingness to pay prices above those that might have been
set by regulators would support the research, development, and marketing
efforts needed to increase the future available pool of drugs. As that pool of
treatment options expands, the growth in supply competition would exert a
downward pressure on prices. In this manner, the deregulation of the market
for INDs would naturally modulate prices, while encouraging the speedy
development of new products.
Recommendation 3: Render voluntary waivers strictly enforceable by
express regulatory provision.
Individual freedom and responsibility of HIV+/PWAs are optimized when
drug manufacturers are encouraged to provide early access to experimental
drugs, either as treatment INDs or on a parallel track.2t2 Policies that reasonably
211. This addresses in good part the "imbalance in power" argument that may be raised by those
demanding regulatory pricing constraints. While marketers of unique patented products under a highly
restrictive FDA approval process have daunting pricing power, marketers of unpatented treatment INDs
under liberalized access have far less power. When AZT became the first and only drug available for
the treatment of AIDS, the manufacturer effectively controlled the only promising treatment for a deadly
disease. The pricing power inherent in such a position is self-evident. As more companies are able to
distribute a wide-variety of drugs under the recent FDA modifications, competitive forces move closer




limit potential liability encourage companies to market these products, thereby
contributing to AIDS patient autonomy.
One such policy is the strict and unqualified support of voluntary, informed
liability waivers. t 3 Respect for waivers will reduce the risk and potential cost
of lawsuits, thereby encouraging companies to market treatment INDs and to
engage in parallel track trials.214 Voluntary waiver is consistent with the
contractarian approach and is a particularly apt mechanism for enhancing a
patient's options. Enforceability of waiver is also philosophically sound: if
patients are to exercise freedom of choice in the realm of unproven drugs, they
should also be held responsible for the risks inherent in the use of such
products.
Clear and unambiguous regulatory support of voluntary waivers is
necessary in order to limit the ability of courts to nullify waivers as
unconscionable." 5 For waivers to function effectively, they must be invulnerable
to attacks based in equity, and this invulnerability must be communicated
clearly to manufacturers analyzing marketing risks. While the unconscionability
doctrine corrects for power imbalances under ordinary circumstances, it can add
little of value to the transactions that occur between pharmaceutical
manufacturers and HIV+/PWAs who purchase their products. Power disparity
is not an extraordinary characteristic in these transactions; rather, power
disparity is the defining characteristic that justifies the transactions. The lack
of any meaningful choice has been the driving force behind the FDA's
concession of authority to HIV and AIDS drug consumers." 6 Under such
212. For discussion of the reasons that current tort liability practices discourage pharmaceutical
companies from the development and manufacture of AIDS treatments, see Sally-Anne Danner, Note,
The Vaccine Ailment: A Cure to Encourage Litigation-Shy Pharmaceutical Companies to Manufacture
an AIDS Vaccine, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 67 (1993).
213. For discussion of the need to allow PWAs to assume the risk of unproven treatments, see Ben
Borson et al., Heightened Treatment Options for Terminal Cases, RECORDER, May 5, 1993, at 10.
214. Companies have delayed the trial and marketing of new drugs because of fears regarding
potential liability. For example, Abbott Laboratories, fearing litigation and product liability, requested
federal government indemnity. When the government failed to respond to the request, Abbott delayed
clinical trials of HIVIG, a promising AIDS treatment. Mike McKee, Company Wants Indemnity Before
It Tests AIDS Drug, N.J.L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at 4. Like governmental indemnification of liability,
enforcement of individual waiver of liability would reduce risk and encourage companies like Abbott
to pursue both clinical trials and concurrent marketing of eligible drugs.
215. Courts may declare contract clauses, including liability waivers, unenforceable for
unconscionability when the voluntary nature of risk assumption becomes doubtful. Typically, this occurs
when the seller has substantially greater power than the buyer, often by virtue of having control over the
only available source of an important good, and the buyer is required to accept the seller's waiver
provisions on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. For more detailed elaboration of the nature of unconscionability,
see JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 397-409 (3d ed. 1987).
216. The limitations on choice for AIDS patients seeking treatment come from several sources.
Obviously, the lack of highly effective treatments means that patients make choices within a highly
circumscribed arena of options: they try to choose the best from a lot that is moderately successful at
best. Moreover, the conditions under which experimental participation will be permitted may be heavily
monitored. Apart from physiological and symptomatic qualifications, patients may also be required to
agree not to receive other, potentially promising treatments, for either the same symptoms or separate
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circumstances, permitting nullification of waivers for unconscionability may
destroy the viability of all waivers, and thus dramatically decrease the
availability of treatment INDs and parallel track trials." 7
Critics of strict waiver enforcement policies question the very idea of
"informed consent ' 218 under the conditions of high uncertainty that are typical
of clinical and parallel track trials of unapproved drugs. Both the "informed"
and the "consent" aspects can be troublesome at the margins. Specifically, two
questions are important: (1) is the patient to be considered adequately informed
when accurately told that the existing information regarding risks is negligible?
(2) when significant information regarding potential costs and benefits of
treatment does exist, how much detail passes the threshold of adequate
informing? In regard to consent, the truly voluntary nature of consent forms
for AIDS treatments has been questioned, under the -reasoning that high-risk
or suspect subpopulations are least likely to be able to resist coercion."1 9
A number of factors may indicate a gap between a signed consent form
and truly voluntary consent. The signer may not read the form, particularly
when the form is highly detailed, elaborate, and legalistic in its language. Even
if the signer does read the form carefully, voluntariness of consent may be
compromised if the patient is especially vulnerable to overpersuasion or
coercion. AIDS occurs disproportionately among several groups who may be
particularly susceptible to undue influence, such as intravenous drug users,
prisoners, prostitutes, and the mentally incompetent.22
These observations underscore the risk that signed waivers or disclaimers
do not reflect an underlying free and informed waiver of future claims. For this
reason, courts can and should assess the reality of informed consent.
Manufacturers seeking to shift the risk of liability squarely onto the shoulders
of patients should be permitted to do so, but only when the manufacturers
ensure meticulously that they receive real, voluntary, informed consent. This
means that signed release forms should be considered fully binding, if and only
symptoms that are being addressed by the experimental drug. Jerome Groopman, Breaking the Drug-
Approval Log-Jam: Rxfor the FDA, NEw REPUBLIc, Feb. 13, 1989, at 17.
217. Because of power disparities between manufacturers and consumers, AIDS patients may believe
they have no meaningful option but to sign liability waivers in order to receive any treatment. The lack
of alternatives should not, however, be the basis for permitting court nullification of technically voluntary
waivers. Nullification for unconscionability would effectively reduce the options of patients further by
discouraging manufacturers from providing treatment INDs or parallel track trials. Moreover, the argument
that patients have no meaningful alternative but to sign non-negotiable waivers is weakened as more drugs
for the treatment of AIDS receive FDA approval, and as more competitors, armed with the ability to
require waivers, compete to sell their treatment IND products.
218. For discussions of the doctrine of informed consent, see Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th
Cir. 1974), Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 779-89 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972).
219. Alison J. Arnold, Developing, Testing, and Marketing an AIDS Vaccine: Legal Concerns for
Manufacturers, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1077, 1089-90 (1991).




if the patient is fully capable of understanding the terms of the agreement,
which have been explained clearly, unambiguously, and straightforwardly.
22
'
Another problem with liability waivers concerns the amount of information
that constitutes adequate informing. Recently, five deaths occurred among
fifteen drug trial participants when a treatment for hepatitis B proved potentially
fatal.222 Several drug research experts examined in this case questioned whether
the informed consent document "told the volunteers enough." '223 Because such
concern is justifiable, enforceable waiver based on informed consent should be
predicated on proof that (a) researchers fairly, accurately, and clearly explain
all known risks; (b) researchers disclose the extent to. which suspected,
potential, but unconfirmed risks may exist; and (c) researchers state, clearly and
conspicuously, that unknown risks may exist, and may reveal themselves during
the course of trials or subsequent to trials.
In other words, waivers should be upheld on the condition that they
provide any and all information available that is material to patients considering
whether to participate in either clinical or parallel track trials or to use
treatment INDs, and on condition that communication of the information is
clear, accurate, and accessible. Under this principle, accurately informing
patients that it is too early in the research process to have identified any risks
constitutes acceptable informing. On the basis of this information, patients can
determine freely the extent to which they wish to undertake unknown risks,
given the range of existing options. The danger of manifestation of unknown
treatment risks is a reality of drug testing, particularly in areas such as HIV and
AIDS research, where the level of scientific and medical understanding is still
low. Free and autonomous agents should be allowed to avail themselves of
untested treatments, provided they are willing to reach consensus with drug
providers regarding risk allocation. If this principle is to be at all meaningful
in practice, courts must be mandated to respect all voluntary risk allocation
agreements, even when patients are agreeing to assume the risk of the unknown.
Recommendation 4: Revoke accelerated approval using surrogate
markers if treatment INDs are made available during all phases of
clinical testing.
221. In regard to highly complex, elaborate, and legalistic terminology, it is reasonable to place a
burden on the provider of the waiver form to explain all material components in plain language. Because
patients will likely be willing to sign relatively unreadable forms without examining them in detail, and
because untutored patients may not understand the meaning of legal terminology, the plain language
requirement is a reasonable one, necessary to the retention of informed consent as a meaningful tool in
increasing access to unproven drugs.
222. Lawrence K. Altman, Fatal Drug Trial Raises Questions About "Informed Consent, ' N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 1993, at C3.
223. Id.
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The FDA approval process is so entrenched in American culture that
citizens and residents of the United States are likely to interpret FDA approval
as confirmation of both safety and effectiveness. Calling a drug "FDA
approved" evokes images of testing and experimentation so rigorous as to
approach proof of safety and efficacy.
The purest contractarian might suggest that the FDA approval process be
abandoned entirely, in deference to freedom of transaction bounded only by
individual decisions based upon assessment of scientific and medical
information. In the real world, FDA approval operates as a necessary
certification process, whereby government officials use their time and expertise
to digest vast quantities of highly technical information in order to render
centralized decisions. This process is valuable, and should be preserved for the
vast majority of drugs that are used by people who do not face life-threatening
diseases for which there are no approved and effective treatments.
Broad, contractarian authorization of treatment INDs for patients faced
with life-threatening diseases is an effective method of meeting the class's
special needs. If we remove regulatory impediments from the 1987
Amendments and permit consensual transactions to treatment INDs during all
phases of clinical trials, then accelerated approval of new drugs becomes
redundant. Likewise, the need for accelerated review via surrogate markers, a
process that may ultimately be harmful, is also largely redundant.
The danger of accelerated approval under the 1992 Amendments is a
function of the relative potential fallibility of surrogate markers as indicators
of safety and effectiveness, and the faith that Americans place in the FDA
approval process. Conclusions based on use of surrogate markers are more
susceptible to error than conclusions based on the primary effects that they
ostensibly represent. As noted above, a recent study suggests that the validity
of CD4 counts as a proxy for health may be less than was once believed.22 4 The
weight that the public places on full FDA approval for marketing is probably
unjustified under the eroded standards of accelerated approval.
An unfettered treatment IND option is preferable to accelerated approval
for marketing, because it achieves the same ends-getting experimental
treatments with no approved alternatives to patients suffering life-threatening
diseases as quickly as possible, without giving inadequately tested drugs an
imprimatur that suggests to the average consumer that they have passed
stringent and exacting standards. Treatment INDs can be labeled as such, clearly
notifying users that they are using inadequately tested or untested experimental
drugs. In contrast, users of drugs that have received accelerated marketing
approval are unaware that these drugs have been approved under a reduced-
threshold standard. Although regulations require post-marketing monitoring of




drugs approved in the accelerated process,225 the consumer simply sees the drug
as proven under FDA's ostensibly high standards. In effect, accelerated approval
will result in the inadvertent deception of many consumers, who are purchasing
experimental treatment labeled FDA-approved.
Recommendation 5: The FDA should carefully monitor
"opportunities" for consultation with manufacturers regarding
research.
Procedures allowing drug sponsors to consult with FDA authorities during
the course of experimental design and IND application compilation were
adopted in 1988 in an effort to expedite drug approval processes.226 While these
provisions are intended to hasten sponsor progress by helping companies do
things properly227 the first time, they are also potential sources of both delay
and scientific conservatism. Whereas unilateral experimental design can move
relatively quickly, impeded only by the limitations of the laboratory itself,
consultation with FDA authorities can add a layer of bureaucracy and delay to
the process. What begins as an opportunity to make use of FDA's resources
in planning methodology and presenting data may become a de facto
requirement, as regulatory authorities may come to view collaborative efforts
as superior to independent efforts. Furthermore, administrative consultation
during early stages of research design may subject the process of developing
innovative projects to the premature influence of bureaucratic control. It may
be unwise to burden incipient creativity with the regulatory realities that every
successful commercial laboratory must ultimately face.
Since these risks may outweigh the potential benefits of early FDA
involvement in research design, the FDA should diligently and fairly monitor
the effectiveness of an early advisory role. The FDA should solicit anonymous
responses from industry laboratories as part of its evaluation of the value of
the pre-approval advising option. If the program is successful, manufacturers
will have incentives to report the program's effectiveness openly and candidly,
as they will benefit from marginal improvements in the approval process. If,
however, the program becomes overly intrusive, or otherwise impedes the
progress of independent research, manufacturer comments to this effect will
have credibility, given that the manifest purpose of the program is to facilitate
the manufacturers' progress.
225. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (1992).
226. Id. § 312.80.
227. "Properly" in this context may conceivably be interpreted to mean, "in a manner that will satisfy
the FDA and be likely to result in FDA approval."
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Recommendation 6: Parallel track trials should be permitted during
all phases of testing, and the mechanism for establishing a parallel
track option should be simplified
Parallel track trials are associated with potential benefits and potential
costs. While promising new drugs are made available more rapidly to
HIV+/PWAs, possibly dangerous or ineffective drugs will also be more quickly
and widely dispersed, without the strict monitoring and review controls
associated with clinical trials.228 Under a contractarian analysis, supported by
a fundamental respect for individual freedom and autonomy, the parallel track
program should remain an option for patients. An individual may elect to
participate, assuming both the risk and the possible reward of a highly
speculative treatment. Conversely, a patient may elect to pursue other options,
concluding that the parallel track is too risky. Under conditions of speculation
and uncertainty, choice should be maximized, as long as parallel track programs
provide the clearest and most forthright explanation possible of potential risks
and rewards, as well as the limitations of parallel track monitoring.
The Public Health Service's stated goal of expanded access229 should
continue to be its preeminent concern. While the scientific functions of parallel
track studies are important, they must remain a secondary goal. Toward this
end, some of the requirements for parallel track proposals may be inappropriate.
As in the case of treatment INDs, the requirement that Phase II approval be
received prior to commencement of parallel track trials23 ° is arbitrary. If we are
willing to use patients for clinical experimentation during Phase I, we should
also be willing to allow them to receive treatment on a parallel track during
Phase I.
Likewise, some parallel track application criteria suggest that availability
of patients for experimentation is still seen as more important than respect for
patients as autonomous individuals. These troublesome criteria include assurance
of manufacturer willingness and ability to support production at adequate levels
to supply both controlled clinical trials and expanded availability study, and
assessment of the effect of parallel track on controlled clinical trial
enrollments.23" ' These provisions are also likely to be wasteful of time and
effort, since companies have little incentive to support parallel track activity
that might jeopardize the viability of premarketing clinical trials. Both the
228. Mary T. Griffin, AIDS Drugs and the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Need for Reform, 17 AM.
J.L. & MED. 363, 381-82 (1991).
229. According to the Public Health Service's own summary of the PHS Policy, the purpose is "to
make promising investigational drugs for AIDS and other HIV-related diseases more widely available
... while the controlled clinical trials essential to establish the safety and effectiveness of new drugs are
carried out." 57 Fed. Reg. 13,250.




number of prospective patient-consumers and the company's ability to produce
sufficient quantities of a product are basic strategic considerations that a
company must take into account in assessing the viability of any market
expansion. Bureaucratic imposition of these requirements is likely to be both
redundant and cumbersome.
Recommehdation 7: The FDA should consider and review foreign drug
summary approval recommendations. 
232
The 1991 proposed drug approval reforms included a recommendation
for expanded U.S. recognition of foreign drug approvals.233 While the use of
foreign approval information and supporting data enhances the total data base
upon which FDA decisions can be made,234 any summary acceptance of either
foreign approvals or supporting data is both unnecessary and highly risky.
The reforms suggested in Recommendations 1 through 6 are intended to
increase contractual access to AIDS drugs by expanding the number of
reasonable alternative routes to such access. These alternative routes push the
balance between access and consumer protection to its limits: they provide
every reasonable opportunity for the exercise of free and responsible choice.
The integrity of the underlying drug approval process, however, must be
upheld. In order for that process to provide a basic level of protection against
dangerous drugs, standards of approval and control over the approval process
must be maintained.Since the degree of scientific rigor required by the drug approval policies
of foreign governments varies greatly, the U.S. government cannot delegate
responsibility to foreign bodies without abdicating its own responsibility to
monitor drug safety and effectiveness. Data from foreign administrative sources
is always potentially useful and can be evaluated on an ad hoc basis. For these
reasons, the FDA should remain open to considering studies conducted beyond
the borders of the United States, as well as other information that can be
supplied by foreign administrative bodies. The ultimate valuation and use of
all such information, however, should remain within the discretion of expert
232. By "foreign drug summary approval," I refer broadly to any partial or complete conclusive
application of foreign drug approval determinations to the FDA approval process. The 1991
recommendation that foreign drug approvals serve as "primary evidence" of safety probably would fall
just short of summary approval if the evidence were merely persuasive, but would pass into the
.unacceptable realm of summary approval if the evidence were viewed as in any way conclusive.
233. See Recommendations to Speed Drug Approvals Issued, supra note 75, at 43,623.
234. For this reason, the FDA should be permitted to analyze data supplied in the process of foreign
drug approval applications to determine the value and persuasiveness of the data. To the extent that
rigorous research findings can be used to support the FDA's own findings, two important goals may be
served: (i) avoiding expenditure of research and development funds on redundant research, freeing those
funds for more original research; and (ii) expediting the drug approval decision process by exploiting
existing high quality research and development. Id.
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FDA staff. If such valuation were to be incorporated in automatic summary
approval through reciprocity, the integrity of FDA approval and FDA standards
would become intolerably compromised.
Recommendation 8: Congress should scrutinize the User Fee Act.
The User Fee Act authorizes the FDA to charge reviewing fees to drug
sponsors in order to increase the number of reviewers and expedite the overall
review process.235 While the goal of hastening the processing of new drug
applications ("NDAs") is laudable, it is also costly. Under the User Fee Act,
administrative efficiency is supported directly by charges paid by those who
file NDAs. In other words, the industry is required to absorb a new cost which
goes directly to support a regulatory bureaucracy that is routinely criticized for
being unnecessarily cumbersome and exacting.
The User Fee Act fashions a remedy for excessive FDA intrusiveness and
bureaucracy by bolstering that bureaucracy with a new source of financial
support. Because this new funding comes from the pockets of private firms
engaged in costly research, the expense of which is ultimately passed to
consumers, the Act may bear a number of negative effects. First, it may
strengthen FDA power and authority over experimental drugs by reinforcing
its administrative ranks via increased outside financing. In other words, by
shifting operational expenses from the bureaucracy's direct budget to private
firms, the User Fee Act potentially increases the entrenchment and potential
complacency of that bureaucracy. Second, it will impose an additional cost of
applied research on all private firms, large and small, thus creating one more
disincentive to engage in new projects. Third, it may cause an increase in the
price consumers are ultimately asked to pay for those drugs that they are
permitted to receive, as manufacturers seek to cover their own increased costs.
Thus the problem of excessive bureaucratization and governmental control will
not be alleviated by taxing regulated entities in order to build, expand, and
strengthen the bureaucracy. Public savings are being purchased at the potential
expense of private efficiency, as another administrative cost is imposed on
pharmaceutical companies.
There remain a number of pressing questions arising out of the User Fee
Act. To what extent can the User Fee Act be expected to expedite the
processing of NDAs? Does the fee requirement discourage private companies
from engaging in AIDS research aimed at new product development? In
instances where no such chilling effect on research is found, does the fee
requirement hinder AIDS drug research by reducing financial resources
available to support laboratory work? Under the principles of a free market,




regulation must be carefully scrutinized to ensure that the protections it offers
outweigh the impediments it places upon private concerns. When these
impediments are in fact directly purchased by those parties subjected to
regulation, the rigor with which we test a regulation's validity should be
redoubled.
Conclusion
The recommendations in this Article are neither overwhelmingly supportive
nor overwhelmingly critical of existing legislative and FDA policies regarding
access to AIDS drug treatments. Generally, the proposals suggest that both
Congress and the.FDA have become increasingly responsive to legitimate public
demands for a system that more flexibly balances individual freedom with
consumer protection. The contractarian approach leaves the basic FDA approval
process intact, but provides alternative channels of access where the exigencies
of AIDS demand greater responsiveness.
While this Article's conclusions address HIV and AIDS specifically, they
logically apply as well to any disease that is life-threatening and for which there
is no approved and relatively risk-free treatment. Those with such diseases
comprise a class whose autonomy interests are great: the stakes are high; the
risks are discounted. When faced with a life-threatening disease for which there
is no proven effective treatment, an individual consumer may reasonably assess
the potential benefit of using an experimental drug as outweighing the risks.
Purer versions of contractarianism might suggest that complete market
freedom be accorded to all sellers and buyers of drugs. This unrestrained model
of contractarianism is rejected for a number of important reasons. First, the
FDA approval process ordinarily serves a useful function. It provides a public
good by assessing a large body of potential pharmaceutical treatments in a
manner that individual consumers cannot replicate. Ordinary consumers lack
the time, resources, scope, incentives, and expertise to evaluate and assess the
treatment virtues of new drugs under investigation. Without a body like the
FDA to take on these tasks, they would remain unaddressed.
Second, the FDA protects important consumer interests. Under normal
conditions, consumer desire to use unapproved products would be an extremist
exercise of individual freedoms. It is not unreasonable for the government to
protect people from irrational choices in complex markets, given the potentially
dire consequences and the negligible potential gains under ordinary
circumstances. Life threatening diseases such as HIV and AIDS, however, are
extraordinary. Regulatory paternalism loses its glimmer when individual stakes
are so high, and when centralized expert judgment yields so little tangible
advantage over private choice. Until HIV and AIDS research provides a true
best option, government regulation of options should be restrained.

